PAKISTAN

A MYTH
OR
A REALITY

BY

VIRENDRA, M.L.A.

WITH A FOREWORD

BY

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FOREWORD

LITERATURE round Pakistan grows and yet there is room for more of it. No question within recent times has aroused such controversy and agitated men's minds to such depths as the proposal for partitioning India. Anything that enables men and women of good will to judge it on its merits should be welcome. I know there are people who think that all labour spent in trying to convince the protagonists of Pakistan to the contrary is labour wasted, as they have definitely shut out all avenues of argument and discussion from their minds. No amount of reasoning and argumentation, it is said, is going to make any difference to them as they are not in a mood to listen. That is undoubtedly true of many, but it cannot be denied that there is a large body which is not deaf to reason, which is anxious to hear and to understand. It is to this body that arguments have to be addressed—arguments based not on sentiment but on solid facts of the situation, arguments strengthened and enforced by the opinions of others who are neutrals and not interested parties and as such entitled to be heard. Arguments vehemently expressed lose much of their force and therefore need to be put in moderate yet firm

language. The strongest arguments are facts and these have to be placed systematically without exaggeration, without mutilation, without extenuation and they cannot fail to influence those who are not obsessed by a slogan and are prepared to listen and to consider and to judge the pros and cons of a serious proposal like the one for the partition of India. Addition of this type to the literature on the subject of Pakistan should, therefore, be well received. Shri Virendra's book is one such addition and deserves to be read by all interested in the subject. The facts relating to the question are by this time well known. The merit of the book lies eir presentation and in the freshness and vigour which he has written.



INTRODUCTION

"PAKISTAN—A Myth or A Reality", by Mr. Virendra, M. A., is a valuable contribution to the ever-growing literature on the Communal issue in India. The author has proved it to the hilt that Pakistan is not a practical proposition. It is a truism to remark that Politics is the hand-maid of Economics. Since Pakistan is an economic absurdity, it is nothing more than a slogan or a stunt. Even the Muslim Leaguers know it in their heart of hearts that the vivisection of India, in the terms of the League Resolution of 1940, is an utter impossibility. Mr. Virendra has given copious citations in support of the contention that the British Government is mainly responsible for the political discord and communal bickerings between the two major communities in this country. Separate electorates have led to the cry of separate nations and the remedy lies in the immediate establishment of joint, territorial constituencies. The myth of the "two nations" has been effectively exploded in this creditable production, which is at once lucid and illuminating.

(Prof.) ABDUL MAJID KHAN

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PREFACE

THIS book is the outcome of fairly deep study of our current political problems during the period of my incarceration, from the 9th August 1942 to 16th March 1945. Nobody is more conscious than myself of the omissions and commissions that find quite a frequent place in this book. But I hope, while giving their verdict, the readers will kindly bear in mind the unfavourable circumstances under which the book was written. As has already been pointed out, this book was planned and prepared during the period of my detention. It has been said that the prison is the fittest place to write a book. This is true to a great extent, provided the writer is fortunate enough to get the necessary material to compile the book. And we know that some of the best books were written in the dark and dingy cells of a prison. But we also know to our cost that the prison life in this country is most wretched and miserable. Here every attempt is made to curb and crush every human and intellectual instinct of a prisoner. The years 1942 to 1945, when the British *Raj* in this country received the greatest threat to its existence, were particularly bad for the political prisoners. Not a book was allowed to pass the Jail gates unless it was

first stamped "Censored and Passed". To keep writing material with us was considered an offence. To possess a book of a political nature was considered a crime, and to write a book in prison was regarded an unpardonable guilt. And yet it was in these circumstances that a major portion of this book was written. I, therefore, hope that the readers will lightly ignore the defects that they find in this book.

The problem of Pakistan has taken a shape which defies any solution. And without a solution of this problem ruin and disaster stares us in the face. The unfortunate part of the whole problem is that very few people in this country have tried to study this problem intelligently. Most of us are carried away by sentiments and slogans, unmindful of the consequences of our actions. In this little book I have tried to show utter impracticability of Pakistan. I know it will not appeal to those who have already made up their minds, and who refuse to listen to reason or logic. But it is bound to clarify the issues for those who have an open mind on the subject, and who are anxious to understand this most vexatious problem.

I am grateful to Shri Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who, inspite of his multifarious activities, managed to go through this book, and has written the foreword. There is probably no other person in our

PREFACE

country to-day, who has devoted so much thought and time to the consideration of this problem. His latest book "India Divided" will rank as the most authoritative contribution to the literature on India's communal problem. By writing the foreword of this small book, he has greatly encouraged me for which I offer him my hearty thanks.

I would be failing in my duty if I do not express my thanks and gratitude to Professor Abdul Majid Khan, who took the trouble of going through the manuscript, and who has made some valuable suggestions. Professor Majid is one of the pillars of true and radiant nationalism. He has made some very valuable contributions to the literature on Communal problem. His suggestions were, therefore, most welcome.

I would also like to thank many others, who prefer to remain anonymous, but who helped in supplying me necessary material inside the prison.

Feb. 1945

[illegible]

PAKISTAN

CHAPTER I

Genesis of Pakistan

WHAT is Pakistan? How will it be achieved? and where will it lead us? These and many such questions have been agitating the minds of the Indian people ever since the fateful day of March 23, 1940 when the All-India Muslim League, in its Annual Session at Lahore passed the resolution now known as the Pakistan Resolution.

Pakistan for the Muslims, according to the spokesmen of the Muslim League, is the only solution of the Indian communal problem. Non-Muslims, on the other hand as a whole, have vehemently opposed the idea of the vivisection of India. It is only natural. As the great Chinese author and philosopher Dr. Lin-Yutang has rightly put it :—

"All Indians love India, but they must love India as a whole and not a part of it. They must love India as a national, cultural, economical, historical and geographical entity. They must have faith that by such patriotism different races and religions can and will live together as a nation, one and indivisible. For historically, in every nation there are periods of integration and periods of disintegration. Those who love India must want her to be fused and integrated into a greater and greater national unity and cultural homogenity. They must know that historically many nations, like Switzerland, the Soviet Republics, China, and America have been able to live and prosper with the greatest diversity of races and within."*1

*1. Dr. Lin Yutang's speech
Times, dated April 11, 1944.

Dr. Lin-Yutang is right, when he says that those who love India must want her to be fused and integrated into a greater and greater national unity. It is for this very reason that every patriotic Indian, including a large number of Muslims, has opposed the idea of Pakistan as envisaged by the Muslim League. There are a number of Muslims who want their right of self-determination, but they scout, the very suggestion of the partition of India into different independent zones. There can be no greater champion of the Muslim cause than Dr. Sayed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, who can justly claim to be the originator of the Pakistan idea. Even he is opposed to the disintegration of Indian unity. Says he :—

" Mr. *Jinnah insists* that the Pakistan States should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relation with the rest of India. I, on the other hand, hold that such an attitude will prove suicidal to the Pakistan States. I firmly believe that in the abiding interests of these states themselves and of the thinly distributed Muslim minorities in Hindu zones, they should, while enjoying perfect freedom or autonomy in their internal affairs, link themselves to the of India to administer with others on terms of equality minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India ".*1

It is, therefore, quite obvious, that in spite of the high sounding claims of the Muslim League, Pakistan still remains a doubtful proposition. It has, no doubt, caught the imagination of the upper middle classes of the Muslims. But a large majority of the Muslim nationalists are still sceptical of its realization and success. Therefore, the question naturally arises—is Pakistan a myth or a reality ?

To answer this question we must first understand the background of the Pakistan movement. This is not a movement of recent origin as some people believe. The Muslim League was not the first to inject the venom of separatism in the body politic of India. The mischief of dividing Hindus and Muslims was first started in the year 1906, when a Muslim deputation led by H. H. the Agha Khan waited upon Lord Minto and asked for separate representation for the Muslims in Legislature and services. But was the deputation led by the people who were genuinely feeling for the Muslim masses, or was it manipulated by some wire pullers who wanted to drive a wedge between different communities of India in order to strengthen their own hold on this country? For the answer we read the following in "The Communal Triangle in India" :—

"The Muslim deputation to the Viceroy led by H. H. the Agha Khan was itself organized from Simla. Maulana Mohammad Ali described it as a "command performance". Mr. Ramsay McDonald has recorded his opinion that it was officialdom that was responsible for the demand as well as the actual introduction of separate electorates. "The Mohammadan leaders are inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials and these officials have pulled wires at Simla and in London and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and Mohammadan communities by showing the Muslims special favours." Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India, who himself favoured joint electorates with reservation of seats, was to declare later that it was the Viceroy who first started the Muslim hare with his early speech about their extra claims.*1

Thus with the introduction of separate electorates the seed was sown for the present demand of the Muslim League

for separate homelands for the Muslims. But how this small seed of separatism was gradually nourished and allowed to develop into a big plant presents an interesting though a painful reading. In 1907 the Government accepted the principl of separate representation for the Muslims and in 1909 this pernicious principle was introduced into the administration of the country. In 1909, we saw the advent of new reforms, and with this new development the existence of Muslims as a separate community became an accomplished fact.

In 1916 the Congress and the Muslim League entered into a pact at Lucknow. Forced by the circumstances the Congress accepted the principle of separate electorates for the Muslims. The British Government had already accepted it in 1909, and thereby made it difficult for the Congress to resist it. In 1919 came the new reforms. The Government rejected every other demand embodied in the Lucknow pact but retained separate electorates in the new constitution, thereby giving a new lease of life to separatism. But this process did not end there. In 1925 we saw a new development in Indian politics. The Government tried to widen the scope of separatism by introducing the principle of communal representation in services. This new policy, inaugurated in 1925, took a practical shape in 1934, when the Government announced its decision to reserve special seats for the minorities in services, specially for the Muslims.

But the greatest blow to Indian unity was struck in 1933 when the Government announced its decision, now known as the Communal Award. With this decision, wrongly called an award not only the principle of separatism was sought to be perpetuated but the biggest apple of discord was thrown into Indian politics. It was claimed at that time, both on behalf of the British Government and the separatist

Muslims of India that the Communal Award will settle the communal problem once for all. But the fact, that the Muslim League to-day insists upon the partition of India is a positive proof of the assertion generally made by the nationalist leaders that the Communal Award not only failed to solve the communal problem but intensified communal bitterness to an extent unknown before in the history of this country. The British Government had given this decision, and, therefore, it can not absolve itself of the charge that it is mainly responsible for the communal estrangement, that is in evidence in India to-day. In reality, incontrovertible facts prove the charge that the British statesmen many a time deliberately tried to wreck every move to bring about communal settlement in India. In 1933, after the announcement of the Communal Award, the British Government, to throw dust in the eyes of the people of this country, as well as to placate British public opinion declared that they would readily accept any settlement between the different communities that would be arrived at, to replace the Communal Award. Accordingly, to test the sincerity of the British Government, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya convened a Unity Conference at Allahabad. It is an undeniable fact that the proceedings of the Conference were running smoothly, and there was every hope of its ultimate success. The most controversial point was that of the representation to be accorded to Muslims in the Central Legislature. After prolonged discussions it was agreed upon that the Muslims should have 32 per cent. seats in the Central Legislature. But the bureaucratic gods of the Whitehall could not countenance this unity amongst Indians. They, therefore, tried to torpedo the Unity Conference. Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Secretary of State for India, in his well-known cunning way announced that the British Government had decided to allot 33⅓ per cent.

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seats to the Muslims in the Central Legislature. The Unity Conference had given 32 per cent. seats to the Muslims and the British Government by announcing its decision to allot 33⅓ per cent. seats, wrecked the Unity Conference. How the British Government tried to perpetuate separatism cannot be described better than by quoting the opinion of the authors of "The Communal Triangle in India". They say :—

"The Government accepted the Communal part of the Lucknow Pact of 1916, while ignoring its political demands. The Congress had reluctantly agreed to separate electorates in the hope that an understanding with the Muslim League will pave the way for responsible government to which the Government was pledged after the war.

In the Montford Report, its distinguished authors expressed themselves against separate electorates, but none-the-less accepted them because of the Congress-League understanding. In 1933 the Communal Award was imposed upon the people for exactly the opposite reasons. In 1919 communalism was introduced because the two parties had agreed to it, in 1935 communalism was extended because Hindus and Muslims could not agree."*1

This noxious principle of separatism has played, and is playing havoc with Indian nationalism. The British Government started the ball rolling in 1907 with separate electorates, and the result is that we are to-day face to face with the most reactionary demand for separate and independent states for Hindus and Muslims. No doubt, some of the British statesmen in their peculiar mischievous and machiavellian way are today advocating cultural and geographical unity of India. But Indian posterity will never forgive them for creating the present unbridgeable gulf between the two main communities of this country. If to-day the communal

*1 'Communal Triangle in India,' p. 75

problem defies any solution the responsibility is theirs and theirs alone. It is for this reason that the Indians have begun to realise, that so long as the present system of government in India exists there can be no settlement of the communal issue. No body can put forward better the point of view of this school of thought than Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. Expressing his views on the subject, he says :—

"Our communal or minority problem would have been settled long ago if a third party had not been always there to play it up and holding all manners of political gift in its hands. So long as British imperialism functions in India, it will be exceedingly difficult to arrive at a real communal settlement. The bid of the British Government can always be higher than that of the other party, and reactionary groups can take advantage of this fact and barter away national freedom for apparent communal gains."*1

Pt. Nehru's view is endorsed by many eminent British authors also. John S. Hoyland says in his book "Indian Crisis" :—

"One of the main causes of the Hindu Muslim hatred is the existence of the pernicious system of separate communal electorates, which came into play in the epoch of the beginnings of Indian democracy, before the last war, and has been perpetuated in constitutional reforms ever since. Under this arrangement, since only Muslims vote for Muslim members of the Legislatures and Hindus for Hindus it is only the communally conscious and embittered Muslims and Hindus that have a chance of getting elected, and they get elected by fomenting communal differences and disagreements, so as to give the voters the impression that the communal candidate has 'ginger' in him, and will stand up for communal rights.

*1. Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Unity of India,' p. 361.

The consequence is a steady deterioration of communal relationship."[*1]

Mr. Lionel Curtis, agreeing with this view, says :—

"The concession of communal representation is the greatest blunder ever committed by the British Government in India. So long as it remains, India will never attain to the unity of modern nationhood. The longer it remains the more difficult will it be to uproot it, till in the end it will only be eradicated at the cost of civil war. To enable India to attain nationhood is the trust laid on us, and in conceding the establishment of communal representation we have been false to that trust."[*2]

History bears enough evidence to this effect. The Allahabad Unity Conference would not have failed, if Sir Samuel Hoare had not given a higher bid by announcing $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. seats for the Muslims in the Central Legislature. Such instances could he easily multiplied. Even in some of the very recent pronouncements of British statesmen we find a tendency to play off one community against the other. To-day the British Government insists upon communal settlement as a condition precedent to any transfer of power to Indian hands. The genesis of this policy can be traced back to a speech delivered by Sir Samuel Hoare, on October 26, 1939 in the House of Commons. He declared :—

"We have shown our good faith in the matter. We showed it when we made the Communal Award. At that time supposing we had wished to divide and conquer we might have very well said—settle your communal differences first, until you have settled them there can be no constitutional advance."

K.B. Krishna has clinched the whole issue by saying :—

"History of communal representation, as we have noted

*1. John S. Hoyland's 'Indian' Crisis, p. 45.
*2. Mahadev Desai's 'Life of Abul Kalam Azad', p. 169.

during the last quarter of a century is the history of the counter poising policy of the British in India, a history of the offsetting of one sectional interest against another, one class against another. It is a history of the growth of professional classes of various historical communities, and consequently a history of the struggles between these various sections. Morley, Montague, and Macdonald each successively contributed to the history of these struggles. At one time Muslims were favoured with a view to counter the Hindu professional classes, at another time the depressed classes were favoured to offset the Hindu caste classes : Morley liked Mohammadans ; Sydenham liked the non-Brahmins ; Montague liked the Sikhs ; Macdonald favoured the depressed classes. Their personal likes coincided with the imperial policy of offsetting one class against another."*1

In the light of these observations one can easily judge Government's present insistence on communal settlement prior to any constitutional advance. Who dare deny that the very basis of the present policy of the British Government in India is "divide and rule." John S. Hoyland corroborating this view, says in his book :—

"We have already recognized the fact that any foreign imperialism is forced to find privileged groups in the conquered territory, by whose aid it can govern the rest, and is bound to foster and protect these privileged groups. In India it has not only been by the aid of the princes and of the rich land owners and later, capitalists that we have governed. It has also been by the aid of the Muslims. They had held the last Great Indian Empire before our coming. They were a strongly self-conscious minority element in most parts of the country, and generally speaking they stood in a privileged economic position as a

*1. K. B. Krishna: 'The Problem of Minorities,' p. 221.

relic of the Moghal domination. Almost automatically therefore they came to be our allies and helpers *vis-a-vis* the great mass of the Hindu population."*1

The British Government's policy of divide and rule reached its culminating point when Sir Stafford Cripps in his offer made on behalf of the British Cabinet recognized the right of a province to secede from the rest of India and form a direct alliance with England. It was the first official recognition of the pernicious demand of partition. Instead of paving the way for unity of different communities in India, the Cripp's offer by recognizing the right of secession, fanned the fire of communal antagonism. It encouraged the Muslim League to stick to its demand and place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of those who were working for the constitution of a free and united India. Cripp's offer was a mortal blow struck at India's unity.

It is in this background that we see the birth and development of the Pakistan movement. To-day Mr. M. A. Jinnah is the leading exponent of this movement. But he was not its originator. The Pakistan idea was first conceived by Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal in December 1930 in his presidential address at the All-India Muslim League Conference held at Lucknow. At that time this idea did not catch the imagination of the Muslim masses. Even the Muslim League did not take any serious notice of it. It was then taken up by Mr. Rehmat Ali, who gave it the name of Pakistan and he founded this movement in 1933. He divided India into two parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan. His Pakistan included the Punjab, N. W. F. Provinces, Kashmir, Sind and Balochistan. The rest to him was Hindustan. His idea was to have an "Independent and separate Pakistan" composed of five Muslim

*1. 'Indian Crisis', page 125.

Provinces in the North as an independent state.*[1] But this scheme never gained popularity and ultimately disappeared out of the picture. Another version of the birth and origin of this movement is given by Wilfred Cantell Smith in his book "Modern Islam in India." Giving his opinion he says :—

"About 1935 in Cambridge, England, a campaign was begun in favour of the idea of Pakistan : that a separate state should be created in the area populated principally by Muslims of North-West India. Some persons envisaged the inclusion also of South Central Asia. Later another state in North East India was suggested. The word 'Pakistan' signifies the country of P-A-K, which some took as the three initials of Punjab, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Others, whose interest in land outside of India was feeble regarded the 'A' as representing the Indian Afghan that is the Pathan of the N.-W. F. Province. Still others thought of 'Pak', the Persian word for pure or holy".*[2]

Another scheme known as the Aligarh Scheme, was also presented to the Muslim public. It was prepared by Professors Syed Zaffar-ul-Hasan and Mohammad Afzal Hussain Qadri of Aligarh. It envisaged, besides other independent zones for the Muslims an independent and enlarged Hyderabad with Berar and Karnatak annexed to it. But the only unofficial scheme that attracted public attention and was discussed by some of the prominent politicians in India was that of Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad. It advocated division of India into cultural zones but pleaded for a confederation. It also visualized large scale transfer of population to make the different zones homogeneous. The following were the leading features of the scheme :—

1. The federating units of the All-India Union to be

*1. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : 'Thoughts on Pakistan,' p. 17.
*2. Modern Islam in India p. 295

sovereign states, two of these sovereign states being one to the North West and other to the North East where the Muslims were in a majority.

2. Units to possess largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers, and the right of secession.

3. The centre to deal with a minimum of subjects, indispensably common to the whole of India as mutually delegated to it by the different units.

4. The centre to be so constituted as not to allow any community or combination of units to dominate the rest.*[1]

Dr. Abdul Latif's scheme was a compromise between the Congress and the Muslim League. He has remained, and is still, an uncompromising opponent of Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan, move. He thinks that Pakistan in isolation, as he calls Mr. Jinnah's move will ruin the Muslims of India, and he has made no bones of his dislike of Mr. Jinnah's scheme. Even while forwarding his proposals to Mr. Jinnah he propounded the same view. In his letter we come across the following :—

"I have too great a regard for you to see you handled roughly by your critics, and I am afraid that that will be your experience if the League is allowed to persist in an over-statement of its case any longer. As I have made no secret of my views to you, I may repeat that the Pakistan scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim states properly so called nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem, nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India ; unless a wholesale exchange of population is affected which no one favours. I am not the only person to hold this view. A compromise on the basis of complete separation is unthinkable, and I therefore entreat you to give your best thought to the proposal. It will save faces on either side. The proposal is a compromise between two ex-

*1 'The Pakistan Issue' p. XXXI

treme views and should be worthy of your kindliest consideration."*1

But Dr. Latif's pleadings failed to carry any weight with Mr. Jinnah. So to-day the only Pakistan scheme which commands the largest support among the Muslims is that of the Muslim League, announced in its Annual Session in Lahore, on 26th Màrch 1940. In this scheme the Muslim League clearly contemplates partition of India into two sovereign and independent states. The resolution on the subject runs as follows :—

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is designated on the following basic principle, *viz.* that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the area in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the N. W. and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

The adequate and effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of the religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic and political administration and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

*1. 'Pakistan Issue' p. XVXIII.

national rights of Hindustan in the territory which now divides the two provinces, specially when he does not expect the two states to collaborate ?"*1

The same view has been expressed by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif. In the course of a letter to late Sir Abdullah Haroon, Chairman Foreign Sub-committee of the All-India Muslim League Dr. Latif wrote as early as the 8th March 1941 :—

" Unhappily for me, I have begun to feel of late that the cry of Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution has no clearness of plan or programme or fulness of design behind it, such as might touch satisfactorily the 9 crores of Muslims in whose name and on whose behalf the cry is going out from our circles and platforms."

Prof. Humayun Kabir a prominent Nationalist Muslim of Bengal confirms the above view when he says :—

"That India shall be a federated state composed of autonomous republican units, must be inevitable to any body who approaches the question with intellectual detachment and honesty. The agreement disappears when we try to define the basis of the units and the nature and functions of the federation or confederacy. The policy of the League is undefined and vague on both these points. Beyond insisting that there shall be two federations it says nothing about their constitution or functions or their relation to one another or to their component units. It is also silent on the question of the boundary organization and political status of the federating units."*2

Mr. Jinnah would probably reject the testimony of Dr. Abdul Latif or Prof. Humayun Kabir as the misguided opinion of some misled persons. But he dare not paint every body with the some brush. Even some of the non-Indian thinkers voice

*1. 'C & M. Gazette,' dated 2nd March, 1944

*2. Humayun Kabir : 'Muslim Politics,' 1906—42, p. 25

the same complaint about his Pakistan scheme. Mr. Wilfred Cantell Smith, a lecturer in Islamic History in the Forman Christian College, Lahore and an extension work associate of Henry Martyr School of Islamic Studies, Aligarh, writes in his book 'Modern Islam in India' :—

"A further point relevent to estimating the support of the Muslim League is that support was unstable. The League's programme was vague, its policy unsettled. It could count on the allegiance of many so long as it painted ideal pictures but did not in fact do any thing. As soon as it should begin to act, it was in danger of losing the support of those attracted only by its slogans."*1

But Mr. Jinnah has proved a hard nut to crack. He has stubbornly refused to enter into any discussion regarding full implications of his Pakistan. Probably, never before in the history of the world a leader has played with the sentiments and desires of his followers so lightly as the Qaid-e-Azam. He exhorts the Muslims of India to live and work for Pakistan, and if need be to lay down their lives for its achievement. But he begins to beat about the bush when a direct question is put to him, and he is asked—what is Pakistan, what are its implications? The only hint given by him so far on the subject is that the constitution of Pakistan will be framed by a constituent assembly. The special representative of the 'Tribune' Lahore, Mr. A. C. Bali, reported Mr. Jinnah's speech delivered at Lahore on March 19, 1944 in the following words :—

"With regard to the constitution of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah, while asking his followers amongst the Mussalmans not to be misled, maintained that they must acquire the territory first before they could frame any constitution for that territory.

*1. 'Modern Islam in India,' p. 297.

Quoting the example of Afghanistan, Mr. Jinnah said that as Nadir Khan came after Aman Ullah and ended the reign of Bacha Sakka, he got possession of the land and then asked the 'Millet' (people) to elect representatives to what was called the constitution-making body which sat to frame the constitution of Afghanistan. Mr. Jinnah said that the form of government in Pakistan and its constitution could only be decided upon by a constitution, making body appointed by the people, and he called it a constituent assembly—that body being a sovereign body to frame the constitution."

Mr. Jinnah is perfectly right when he says that the constitution of Pakistan will be framed only after the territory has been acquired. But the question that remains unanswered is—how is he going to acquire that territory, and how is he going to maintain its sovereignty? How is he going to meet the financial liabilities of Pakistan, specially of the deficit provinces like the N.-W.F., Sind and Baluchistan? What is going to be the fate of the Muslim minorities in Hindustan, and the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan? How is he ing to link the Eastern Pakistan with the Northern Pakistan? These and many such questions have been repeatedly asked by the supporters as well as the critics of the Pakistan Scheme but Mr. Jinnah and his Muslim League have evaded the issue, and would probably keep on evading it till eternity. They know that if once they enter the arena of discussion, they will have no ground to stand upon, and without discussion no settlement is possible. Mr. Jinnah has often tried to bully his critics but has miserably failed to intimidate them. He forgets that important problems, with which is linked the fate of millions of human beings can never be solved by threats and abuses. But let us not walk into the same trap. Whether we like it or not Pakistan has become an important issue. It

is bound to effect the future destiny of millions of our countrymen. Whether India is going to remain a united and indivisible nation only, the future will decide. But it is time, that we become fully aware of all the pros and cons of this problem, so that when the time comes for us to take our final decision we may not be found wanting. In this chapter we have discussed the background of the Pakistan movement. We have also studied its genesis and development. In the chapters that follow we shall discuss the social, economical and political implications of Pakistan.



CHAPTER II

Muslims in Pakistan

MR. JINNAH and the Muslim League assert that Pakistan not only solves the intricate communal problem of India, but ensures the political, economic and social future of the Mussalmans of India. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss the communal problem as such and the method by which it can be solved. But we do want to examine the claim of the Muslim League that Pakistan ensures a brighter and safer future to their co-religionists. The future of a great community can not be safeguarded simply by building castles in the air. It requires solid and unbreakable foundations which can stand the hardest test of time, and can face vicissitudes of the future. Does Pakistan fulfil the requirements of a strong, stable, dependable and self-supporting state? Will it ensure the continuance of the present unity of the Muslims of India, or will it disintegrate them into bits and throw them into hostile camps? These are some of the questions, which require a clear and unambiguous reply, and which will demand our attention in the next few pages.

Before we proceed to examine in detail the effects of Pakistan on the Muslims of India, let us first study a few figures, which will give us some idea of the numerical strength of the Muslims which result from Pakistan.

Population in the Muslim Majority Provinces according to 1941 census :—

Provinces	Muslims	Muslim P.C.	Hindus	Sikhs
Punjab ...	16,217,242	56.5	7,550,372	3,757,401
Bengal ...	33,005,434	54.73	25,059,024	16,281
N.W.F. ...	2,788,797	91.97	180,321	57,939
Sind ...	3,208,325	70.75	1,229,926	31,011
Baluchistan	438,930	87.50	44,623	11,918
Total ...	55,658,728	...	34,064,266	3,874,550

Population in Hindu Majority Provinces according to 1941 census :—

Province		Hindus	Muslims
Assam	...	4,213,223	3,442,479
Bihar	...	26,514,269	4,716,314
Bombay	...	16,555,390	1,920,368
U. Provinces	...	45,811,669	8,416,308
Madras	...	42,799,822	3,896,452
C. P. Berar	...	12,931,996	783,697
Orissa	...	6,832,706	146,301
Ajmer	...	376,481	87,899
Delhi	...	567,225	304,971
Total	...	156,602,781	23,716,789

Population of States, with Muslim Majorities in the Punjab :—

Kapurthala	...	378,300
Bahawalpur	...	1,341,209
Khairpur	...	305,787

"The right of non-accession to the union, as contemplated in the draft declaration, has been conceded presumably, in response to the insistent demands by the Mussalmans for the partition of India, but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object, for in the draft proposals the right of non-accession has been given to the existing provinces, which have been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis."

And yet Mr. Jinnah clings to these boundaries which even according to the Muslim League have no logical basis. It is difficult to understand Mr. Jinnah's logic. He condemned the present boundaries of Pakistan as illogical, when Sir Stafford Cripps wanted to retain them. He swears by them now, when Gandhiji, in order to find some way out of the communal impasse suggests redistribution of provinces. This inconsistency of Mr. Jinnah has provoked even the best friends of the Muslim League to sound a note of warning. So we read in the "People's War", the greatest advocate of India's partition :—

"Mr. Jinnah bases his plea on a Muslim majority and wants to retain the British-made boundaries of the existing provinces. How then can he object to a British United India being ained with its Hindu majority? Pakistan is a freedom emand for Muslim home lands, how then can non-Muslims' home lands be included in it? In the name of Muslim freedom Sikh home lands can not be claimed. A western Punjab can not live without Central Punjab, if Eastern Bengal is weak without Western Bengal, then, it becomes an argument based on need and not on right. This question obviously needs negotiations for guaranteeing the non-Muslim people complete equality, full justice and their prior agreement."*1

*1. 'The People's War,' dated *Oct. 15, 1944.*

It is obvious that in this respect Mr. Jinnah's position is untenable and unsound. But if the Muslim League Resolution is to be given a concrete shape some principle will have to be enunciated by which the Muslims can have a separate home land for themselves. As there is no other authoritative pronouncement on the subject on behalf of the Muslim League, the Lahore resolution of the League is the only guide for us. This resolution envisages—

"The establishment of completely independent states formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions, which shall be so constituted, with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent states as Muslim free national home lands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

It is significant that the Muslim League resolution does not name the contiguous units. While recognizing the need for territorial re-adjustment it only lays down a certain principle which will determine those units. It is, therefore, not necessary, that the present provincial boundaries must be maintained and Mr. Jinnah, more than any body else, knows it. He would not have discussed with Gandhiji the question of demarcation of boundaries if he had not realized that the present boundaries can not be maintained. But an astute and clever politician that Mr. Jinnah is, he believes that in political warfare the best strategy is always to strike first. He knows that, if Pakistan is to come into being, the question of demarcation of boundaries is bound to crop up. Therefore to forestall his opponents he has already started agitation for the inclusion of some Hindustan territory into Pakistan. It was probably for this reason that, after the breakdown of his

which the whole structure of North-Western Pakistan is going to be built. If the Punjab fails, the other provinces can not survive and the Punjab is bound to collapse without these 13 districts. If the Muslim League insists upon the vivisection of India, and Pakistan comes into being, these thirteen districts will go out of Pakistan. No amount of platitudes or threats can force the non-Muslims of these thirteen districts to remain in Pakistan. And it is not in the interest of even the Muslims that these thirteen districts should remain in the Punjab. If Pakistan is to function as the Muslim League wants it to function, then it must not only be contiguous area, but it should have within it as far as possible and practicable a homogeneous population. With these thirteen districts included in the Punjab this will not be possible. There the non-Muslims are in a majority, and sooner or later they are bound to assert themselves and the result will be the inevitable clash. Therefore, it is in the interest of both Muslims and non-Muslims, that in the event of the establishment of Pakistan the thirteen districts with non-Muslim majority should go out of Pakistan. Whether they should join any other province or form a separate province is another question. But they can not and must not remain in Pakistan. If any attempt is made to keep them there, it is bound to be resisted strongly. By no standard of justice or fairplay can they be forced to live in Pakistan, specially when the Muslim League itself has declared that only those territories in which the Muslims are in a majority should be constituted independent states. Muslim League can have a separate state of their own if they insist upon it, but they cannot force others to join their state. Therefore, any forcible inclusion of these thirteen districts would mean war to the knife. It is high time that the Muslim League leaders realized the implications of their demand for Pakistan. They can have a united Punjab as a

part of united India with full provincial autonomy to develop the province as they wish. But if they want a separate independent state they should be prepared to give up those districts, where the non-Muslims are in a majority. They are today standing at the cross roads, it is for them to decide which road they want to tread.

BENGAL

The total population of Bengal is 60,606,525. Out of the 28 districts, eleven districts have non-Muslim majority and the population of these eleven districts is 16,989,025—12,694,053 Hindus and 4,294,972 Mussalmans. As already stated according to the resolution of the Muslim League only those areas are to be constituted independent units which have numerical Muslim majority. Consequently, these eleven districts are free to go out of Eastern Pakistan. The Muslim League would certainly like to keep them under its thumb ; but they can not and will not succeed. Bengal Hindus are much more conscious and organized than the Hindus of any other province in India. It was this strength, determination, courage of conviction and will to suffer and sacrifice on their part that had forced the British Government to annul the partition of Bengal. The Government can not forget that powerful movement which shook the province of Bengal from one end to the other. Therefore, whatever shape the demand for Pakistan might take, these eleven districts would not submit to any dictation, in the matter of joining or keeping out of Pakistan. In the first instance, the Hindus of Bengal will resist with all the strength and determination that they can command any attempt to divide India. If they fail, they will not let, at least, these eleven districts be annexed to Pakistan. It, therefore, means that in case a separate independent state is established in Eastern Pakistan, 16,989,025 persons will be out of it. A

these eleven districts are the most important from the economic and industrial point of view. They are the centre of Bengal's main industry and commerce. The greatest loss to Pakistan will be the city and port of Calcutta As Professor Reginald Coupland rightly puts it :—

" Just as the Sikhs are the crux of Pakistan, so is Calcutta the crux of North-East India. In both cases the partitionists apparently take inclusion in the Muslim state granted. Yet the population of Calcutta and its neighbourhood is predominantly Hindu. The city itself contains 1,531,512 Hindus 79,844 other non-Muslims, and 497,535 Muslims. It lies in 24 Pargana districts which, excluding the city, contain 2,309,996 Hindus, 78,210 other non-Muslims, and 1,148,180 Muslims. Thus both in the city and the district the proportion is over 2 to 1 in favour of non-Muslims. And this balance is reflected in City's cultural and commercial life. All Bengalees whether Muslim or Hindu may well be proud of the fact that Calcutta both in culture and in commerce is the Queen of Indian cities, but in both, apart from the great contribution of British enterprise to the latter, the Hindu share predominates. Muslims have substantial business interest in the area, but the Hindu interests are unquestionably greater."*1

In this connection it would be refreshing to study the view of the great constitutionalist Professor K. T. Shah. Discussing the future status of Calcutta *vis-a-vis* Pakistan he gives the following interesting dialogue to explain his point of view :—

" Calcutta has a heavy Hindu majority ", said Garudeshan, " as you will see at a glance from the figures placed before us. And, following the line we have agreed upon it ought to form part of the Hindu or Western Bengal ".

*1. R. Coupland : Constitutional Problem of India, 3rd part, p. 88.

"At a stroke, the Bengal will lose its direct access to the sea," asked Abdul. "Will there be any seaport in the Muslim or Eastern Bengal?"

"Chittagong may serve the purpose of a seaport," answered Sir Mohammad, "but not compensate for the loss of Calcutta. But I do not see why Calcutta should not be joined to the Eastern Bengal?"

"The reason is obvious," said Krishna, "and agreed to already. Calcutta, which, in point of population is larger than many a district, has an overwhelmingly Hindu majority in population."

"The remaining districts of Bengal, which have a substantial Muslim majority," said the Professor, "will not have sufficient trade to need a port like Calcutta. The coal and iron and rice of Bengal are all found in the Western or Hindu majority districts. Even the tea from the Northern hill slopes will be in those areas."

"There still remains the greatest single product of modern Bengal," said Abdul. "Jute, which will come largely from the Eastern districts with Muslim majority, while bulk of the tea gardens will be in Assam, which will also find it more advantageous to combine with the Muslim areas for its export trade."

"Raw Jute, perhaps," said Professor, " though of that too I am not quite sure, but Jute manufactures will be in the Hindu majority areas for the most part. The exportable Jute —raw or manufactured—will be only a vulgar fraction of this present day source of wealth of Bengal."

"Deprived of coal and iron," said Col. Singh, "the prospects of Bengal's intensive and extensive industrialisation would be very slender. And thanks to her permanent

settlement, breeding a lazy, improvident, incompetent landlord class, it will have no enterprize to make up for the deficit. I think the only remedy for the woes of Bengal is to abolish the permanent settlement, execute the landlords, and expropriate all their *sub-infeudations*, or subsidiary parasites "*1

How unreasonable, fantastic and impossible is the demand of the Muslim League that the whole of Bengal should be included in Pakistan can be realized from the following opinion expressed by P. C. Joshi, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India. It is an undeniable fact that the Indian Communists are in a way more Royal than the King. No other party in the country, not even the Muslim League itself has propagated so much *the idea of* Pakistan as the Communist Party. If the leader of this party says that the demand of including the whole of Bengal in Pakistan is unreasonable, then nothing more is required to prove the absurdity of this demand. This is what Mr. Joshi says :—

" In the whole contiguous territory which is *their home*-land, the Bengali Muslims have a right to form their separate and sovereign state—their Pakistan State.

But by the same right by which they demand Pakistan, they cannot claim as a right that the Western Hindu Districts be also included in their *Pakistan* State. In *these* districts, *the Muslim* percentage falls as low as 5 in Bankura and does not go beyond 34 in 24 Parganas, except for the border line case of Khulna with its 49.5 p. c. Calcutta with its port falls in th is area, but has only 26 p. c. Muslims.

All the main industries, Jute, iron and coal are also in this area, spread over the districts of 24 Parganas, Howrah, Hoogli, and Bardwan. In fact, the industries concentrated here are 30% of the Indian industries. While in Eastern Bengal the percentage is only 27 p. c. At present Hindu Bengal with Calcutta is the richest and most vital part of Bengal.

*1. K. T. Shah : ' Why Pakistan and Why Not ? ' page 156.

The Muslims can rightly complain that Eastern Bengal without the industries of the western districts and the port of Calcutta will be moth-eaten and mutilated. But the Muslims can not say; we will annex Western Bengal and Calcutta to our Eastern Pakistan State, because we are in majority in Bengal as a whole. Bengali Muslims object to united Bengal being part of the free Indian Union, because they fear that the Hindu dominated centre will bolster up the powerful Hindu minority in Bengal, and nullify the majority rule. But if the whole of Bengal goes in Eastern Pakistan, the Hindus of western districts will raise the same objection."*1

In the light of the observations made above we fail to understand how the Muslim League is in any way justified in demanding the whole of Bengal as their homeland. They can have their own share if they like but they can never have the whole of Bengal.

ASSAM

The Muslim Leaguers claim Assam also as one of the Provinces of Pakistan. This is a most preposterous and irrational claim. In Assam, the Muslim population is only 33.7 p. c., and Sylhet with 61 p. c. Muslim population is the only district which has Muslim majority. There is no doubt that if Bengal decides in favour of partition of India, Assam will find itself in tight corner. But Pakistan can not claim it as a matter of right. Once again the Communists have disapproved the claim of the Muslim League when they say—

" Most astounding is the claim to the whole of Assam where the Muslims are only 33 p. c., and the tribals 36 p. c. Historically and numerically if Assam is the homeland of any it is of the Assam tribals. Sylhet is Bengali Muslim

*1. P. C. Joshi : " They Must Meet Again." pp. 35-36.

and it should of course go to Eastern Bengal. After Sylhet is gone back to Bengal, the Muslim majority gets further reduced. The Assamese have a common language, common culture, and a common economy, entirely different from that of Bengal. In fact Assamese of all shades are prepared to let rich Sylhet go to Bengal so that they may develop their homeland as a homogeneous unit. Herein they must be thanked by Mr. Jinnah and not have their homeland claimed by him. The only argument he can advance for the whole of Assam will turn out to be the same that the Akhand Hindustanis make for United India."

In view of observations made above we have now to find what shape Pakistan will take if the Resolution of the Muslim League is enforced. The following figures will give some idea of the shape of things to come if Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League takes a practical shape :—

Muslims in Pakistan

Muslim population of N. W. F. P. ...	2,788,797
Muslim population of Sindh	3,208,325
Muslim population of Baluchistan ...	438,930
Muslim population of Punjab without 13 districts with non-Muslim Majority	12,363,722

Muslims in Hindustan

Muslim population in Assam without Sylhet	1,550,362
Muslim population in Bihar ...	4,716,314
Muslim population in Bombay ...	1,920,368
Muslim population in U. P. ...	8,416,308
Muslim population in Madras ...	3,896,452
Muslim population in C. P. & Berar	783,697
Muslim population in Orrisa ...	146,301

Muslims in Pakistan	**Muslims in Hindustan**
Muslim population of Bengal without 11 districts with non-Muslim majority 28,710,462	Muslim population in Ajmer ... 87,899
Muslim population of district of Sylhet in Assam 1,892,117	Muslim population in Delhi ... 304,971
	Muslim population of 13 districts of Punjab with non-Muslim majority 3,853,520
	Muslim population of 11 districts of Bengal with non-Muslim majority 4,294,972
Total ... 49,402,353	**Total** ... 29,971,164

The total number of Mussalmans who will remain in Hindustan, and will always be at the mercy of the non-Muslims will be 29,971,164. To this must be added the number of Muslims in States because Mr. Jinnah has declared in unequivocal terms that the Pakistan Scheme is meant for the Muslims in British India only, and that the Muslim League is not concerned with the Indian states. Only recently when during their talks Gandhiji asked, " How are the Muslims under the princes to be disposed of as a result of the scheme ?" Mr. Jinnah replied, that the Muslim League resolution is only confined to British India and does not concern the Muslims under the Princes. It is, therefore, obvious, that the Muslims living in Indian States are not to come under the so-called protecting wing of Pakistan. Therefore, the total number of Mussalmans who will remain out of Pakistan will be 42,608,839, (29,971,164 in British India and 12,637,675 in Indian States) while the number of those who will join Pakistan will only be 49,402,353 *i.e.*, 50% of Muslims will only be safeguarded and the rest will be left at the mercy of Hindus of whose intolerable repression and

so much has been said in recent years by the propagandists of the Muslim League.

In the light of the facts and figures given above, we leave it to the readers to decide as to how far the claim of the Muslim League that the Pakistan is the only solution of the communal problem is justified. It will not solve the communal problem, it will rather accentuate it. Prof. K. T. Shah has put the whole case most ably when he says—

" Not to mention the fact, that, by conceding and admitting the right to secede for any region with a majority of a given community. The problem of an alien minority would not be solved ; it will only be duplicated. For even in the seceding provinces forming separate states, there would be, admitting this hypothesis, alien minorities of Hindus in Pakistan, and of Muslims in Hindustan. They would always be a thorn on the side of the majority, always be liable to the suspicion of being fifth columnists, and always open to the temptation to act like the Sudetan Germans in Czechoslovakia." *1

And according to Dr. S. U. Ansari, "Pakistan would merely reproduce on a smaller scale the very problem which it claims to set out to solve." *2

Pakistan, therefore, will not solve the communal problem, nor will it safeguard the interest of at least 50 percent of Muslims of India. Regarding the rest also, it is doubtful if it will be able to unite or unify them. *Muslims belonging to different* regions have different traditions and different customs. They speak different languages, they wear different dresses. *Not to* say of cultural and traditional differences of Mussalmans, of Eastern and Western Pakistan, all the Mussalmans of even one region do not speak the same language and observe the same customs. There is nothing common between the Muslims of

*1. K. T. Shah—'Why Pakistan & Why Not,' p. 57.

*2. Dr. U. S. Ansari—'Pakistan the Problem of India.' p. 73.

Bengal and the Muslims of N.-W.F.P. or the Muslims of the Punjab and Sind, except that they belong to one religious community. And there is no guarantee that in case of partition all the Muslim provinces are bound to remain in Pakistan. There are indications that at least one or two if not more of these provinces might go over to Hindustan. The recent political developments in the N.-W.F. Province give us some indication of the shape of the future events. The N.-W.F.P. is a predominently Muslim province and yet in this very province the Muslim League has failed to form a ministry. No doubt in the Congress also there are Mussalmans who want the right of self-determination, but they are not in favour of the partition of India. It can be said with confidence that if the nationalist Muslims of the N.-W.F.P. are ever called upon to choose between Hindustan and Pakistan, they will side with Hindustan. And they are a powerful majority in their province. Therefore, there are all the prospects of the N.-W. F.P. refusing to join the proposed Pakistan Scheme. We find a confirmation of this assertion in the following interview given by Mr. Abdul Qayum, a prominent leader of the N.-W.F.P. to a special correspondent of the 'People's War':—

" Question :—What do you think of the League's stand of Pakistan ?

Answer :—The League's stand is a demand for self-determination of the Mussalmans. I would rather say of the Muslim national units. It is their right to decide whether they will go in for complete separation, whether they will vote against separation or for autonomous provinces with delegated power to the centre. We Afghans of the N.-W. Frontier claim the right of self-determination to that extent. Pakistan will have to take into account our Afghan nationalism.

Geographically, historically, economically and culturally, we of the N.-W. Frontier, the people of Northern Baluchistan, and the tribal belt, and the people of Afghanistan have every thing in common. Why should we be forced to go with the Punjab into Pakistan? From our own utilitarian point of view we should be allowed to decide where we will go. If we did not unite with Afganistan, it is because it is monarchical and backward. If we desire to unite with India, it is because India is more advanced industrially and with its help we could improve our conditions of life and develop our land."*1

Religion has nowhere in the world been recognized as a test of nationhood. If religion were to be considered the basis of a nation then the Muslims of India and the Muslims of Turkey and Iran should be considered members of the same nation. But they are not. Prof. Coupland criticising the stand taken by the Muslim League says :—

" There is another point on which the ideology of Partition seems out of date. The nationalism it preaches is based on religion. It is because they are Muslims that the Muslims of India are entitled to political independence. It is because they are Muslims that the trend of their future international associations should be turned away from India and towards the Middle East. Such ideas are the natural outcome of the old Islamic philosophy of life in which the church and the state were indivisible. Not long ago they were a common place of the Muslim world. But one of the most remarkable results of the war of 1914–18 was a change it brought about in Muslim political thought. For the new tide of nationalism which it set running through all the Muslim countries from Morocco to Afganistan was not dominated by religious fanaticism. If it was directed against Christians, it was not primarily associated with the notion of a holy war. How far the Muslims in their

*1. 'The People's War', dated Dec. 10, 1944.

desire to be free from European domination had adopted the European conception of national state was finally demonstrated by events in Turkey. The dramatic recovery of the Turks from the disasters and humiliations of the war was followed by the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the complete secularisation of the Turkish state. Thus political pan–Islamism was deprived at a stroke of its main foundations. In other Muslim countries—in Egypt, Persia, Iraq, and Syria, nationalism, though nowhere so secularist as in Turkey, assumed a similar Western complexion. Observers in the West began to ask if the words 'Islamic world' had not lost their political meaning if the roll of Islam in Muslim countries was not destined sooner or later to be assimilated to that of the churches in the Christiān countries. Indian Muslims can scarcely have forgotten the reaction of those developments on Indian politics.................
....Are Muslims of Ankara or Cairo or Bagdad likely to feel that their political interests are closely linked with the prospects of Pakistan? The members of the Turkish Press Mission, which visited India early 1943 were reported to have shown scant interest in or sympathy with the Pan-Islamic aspiration of the Indian Muslim League thinking those to be anarchonistic."*[1]

It is really a strange phenomenon that while other Muslim countries are trying to get out of the religious morass, our Muslim countrymen are going deep down in it, and to-day it has become impossible for them to think dispassionately over a problem which effects millions of their countrymen. Turkey is to-day supposed to be the most advanced and progressive Muslim country in the world, and it is in this country that we find that religion has been completely separated from politics and no religious interference in the affairs of the state

*1. R. Couplan: 'The Constitutional Problem of India,' Part III, p· 105

is tolerated in any shape or form. The "Peoples party,' the most organized and powerful organization, does not countenance religious interference in political affairs. Therefore, in the programme and policy of the republican party of the people we read the following :—

" As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the success of a nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the state." *1

These sentiments found an echo in the refusal of Turkey to accept an invitation to be represented at the General Congress of Islamic Faith held in 1931. The Turkish Foreign Secretary, indeed, on that occasion condemned the project of such a conference, saying, " such invitations are of no value to any country..................and distract peoples from path of progress. In particular we are opposed to any internal or external policy which makes use of religion as a political instrument."*2

This tendency to divorce religion from politics is gaining strength not only in Turkey but in almost all Islamic coun- ;- Religion does not command the same allegiance as it used to, but is being allotted a secondary position in private and national affairs of the Muslims. Commenting on this state of affairs, H.A.R. Gibb writes :—

" Islam as a religion, has lost little of its force, but Islam as the arbitrator of social life is being dethroned ; along side it or above it new forces exert an authority which is sometimes in contradiction to its traditions and its social prescriptions, but nevertheless forces its way in their teeth. To put the position in its simplest terms, what has happened is this. Until

*1. Parker & Smith—'Modern Turkey,' p. 238.

*2. 'Modern Turkey' p. 186.

recently, the ordinary Muslim citizen and cultivator had no political interests or functions, had no literature of easy access except religious literature, had no festivals and no communal life except in connection with religion, saw little or nothing of the outside world except through religious glasses. To him, in consequence, religion meant every thing. Now, however, in all the more advanced countries, his intercsts have expanded and his activities are no longer bound by religion. He has political questions, thrust on his notice ; he reads or has read to him a mass of articles on subjects of all kinds which have nothing to do with religion, and in which the religious point of view may not be discussed at all and the verdict held to lie with some quite different principle ; he finds that in many of his difficulties and disputes it is useless for him to apply to the religious codes, but that he is bound by a civil code which derives its validity from, he may not know where, but certainly not from the Qur'an and tradition. The old religious interests have ceased to furnish his soul, or even his main social link with his fellows ; other and secular interests claim his attention. The authority of Islam is thus loosened in his social life, and it is relegated little by little to a narrower range of activities.

....

It seems impossible now, specially in view of the increasing demand for education and the increasing adoption of western institutions, to reverse the current and to restore Islam to its old unquestioned monopoly of social and political influence."*1

Religious confirmity can not, therefore, be the basis of a national state. Had religion been recognized as the basis of nationhood, different Muslim countries would not have tried at different times to cut each other's throat. " Arabs are Muslims like the Turks, but they did not hesitate to co-operate with Britishers, who are Christians, to throw off the Turkish

*1. H.A.R. Gibb—' Whither Islam,' p. 335-36.

yoke. Religious confirmity is one thing, identity of economic and other interests another."

It is because of the feeling that the establishment of Pakistan will destroy the solidarity of Muslims and will jeopardize their interests, that a very large number of Muslims are opposed to it. Professor Humayun Kabir has summed up his case against Pakistan in the following words :—

" Pakistan, which is to-day declared to be the goal of the Muslim League, is thus against the teachings of modern history. It is, in fact, against the teaching of history in every land. No race or poople has prospered by seeking to conserve itself. Nations as well as individuals have triumphed only when they have sought to expand themselves in all directions. Cultures live by expansion. The attempt to withdraw within narrow shatters and maintain parity or integrity has invariably resulted in decay and death. Indian Muslims can also survive only by a spirit of expansion and growth."*1

*1. Humayun Kabir—'Muslim Politics,' 1906—42, p. 45.

CHAPTER III

Pakistan and the Minorities

What is going to be the status of the minorities in Pakistan ?

Before we attempt any elucidation of this point, we must understand, what do we mean by minorities? So far in political parlance, we have been considering all the communities except the Hindus as the minority communities. But while considering the question of Pakistan, we have to give a different interpretation to the term " minority." We have to consider Muslims as such not in terms of a minority, but in terms of a nation. Now, minorities will be labelled all those elements in Pakistan who are either non-Muslims, or in a minority amongst the Muslims, and who do not see eye to eye with the Muslim League. We will then come across two categories of minorities : (1) Non-Muslims like Hindus, Sikhs, Scheduled Castes, Parsis, Christians and others, (2) Muslim minorities like Shias, Momins, etc.

We must understand the feelings and sentiments of those minorities, and also what is going to be their fate in the proposed Pakistan State. No state, however organised and powerful, can function smoothly with a strong and discontented minority within its frontiers. Minorities problems have assumed great importance during the last quarter of a century. The League of Nations had to put in a great deal of effort to solve the problem of European minorities and the Second World War is a standing proof of the fact that it failed to solve this problem. While giving their verdict on the causes of the Second World War, the future historians will certainly co

the minorities problem as a major factor responsible for this great catastrophy.

In our own country the minorities problem has often proved the greatest hurdle in our march towards freedom and progress. Pakistan is no solution of the problem, as minorities problem will still remain in Pakistan and Hindustan. As Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru has rightly put it :—

" Pakistan was no solution of the communal problem. In both the zones minorities would remain. Moreover the country could not be divided on religious basis. The League can demand separation only of those areas where the Muslims are in an overwhelming majority. It must be remembered that this means division of Bengal and the Punjab. You cannot ask people of those areas of Bengal and the Punjab, where non-Muslims are in a majority, to go to Pakistan. Will the Punjabis or Bengalis, whether Muslims or Hindus, like their provinces, which are homogeneous linguistic units to be divided? These are the problems to be faced."

Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly declared that the rights of minorities would be safeguarded by treaties between the two states of Pakistan and Hindustan. But he has not explained as to how will he be able to bind these states to observe these treaty obligations, and what will he expect any of those states to do, if the treaty obligations are disregarded by any of the states. So far Mr. Jinnah has preferred to keep mum on the point, and his silence has a significance of its own. But whatever Mr. Jinnah or the Muslim League say to the contrary, the fact remains that there can be no Pakistan, unless the minorities in the Pakistan regions are satisfied, and are prepared to support the demand of the Muslim League. The minorities refuse to be passive pawns in this game of power politics. In spite of their uncompromising attitude, Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League will have to take into account the

feelings and sentiments of the minorities. It is probably the realisation of the importance of the role that the minorities can play in the future constitution of India, that Mr. Jinnah has lately been trying to woo the minorities. He has repeatedly asked the Sikhs to let him have their terms of co-operation, but his pleadings have failed to evoke favourable response. He has also publicly acknowledged that opposition by the Hindus will create difficulties in the attainment of Pakistan. It is, therefore, clear that the attitude of the minorities will, to a great extent, decide the fate of Pakistan. Let us, therefore, consider what attitude the minorities are likely to adopt towards any attempt to establish Pakistan.

HINDUS

In Bengal the Hindu population is 45·27 per cent. and in the Punjab it is 28 per cent. In Bengal, in spite of their being a minority, they are more powerful politically and economically than the majority community. They are a force to be reckoned with, and no political or communal settlement can bear fruits unless it has the support of the Hindus of Bengal. History has proved quite often that no arrangement can continue for a day by riding rough-shod over the sentiments of the Hindus of Bengal. The annulment of the partition of Bengal will ever remain a standing proof of the strength and influence of the Hindus of that province. No doubt, they have failed to get the Communal Award withdrawn, or modified according to their desires. But the fact that no ministry in Bengal can function successfully which hasn't got the backing of the real representatives of the Hindus, gives us some idea of the important role that the Hindus in Bengal can play, and are playing. Muslims can get rid of this menace to Pakistan only if they partition Bengal, and let eleven districts with non-Muslim majority including Calcutta, go out of Pakistan. But then it will become " Mutilated and moth-

eaten Pakistan." Therefore, the Muslim League, and the supporters of Pakistan can not but suffer the presence of a powerful minority of Hindus in Pakistan, who will always remain a standing menace to their very existence. There are a number of groups amongst the Hindus of Bengal. Some are Congressites, others are Hindu Sabhaites, and there are others who call themselves Forward Blockists. They have different political convictions and are wedded to different political ideals. But they all are united on one issue, and that is, that they are not prepared to tolerate the establishment of Pakistan. They will leave no stone unturned to thwart any and every attempt to divide India into water-tight compartments. And they have made no secret of their intentions. They have proclaimed it from house tops that they will not let Pakistan come into existence. It is difficult at present to prophesy, as to what will happen when Pakistan is established. For that we must await the verdict of history. But one thing can be said with certainty that in case of partition of India, the Hindus of Bengal will consider it a challenge to their very existence, and they will not take it lying down. They may fail or succeed, but they will strike, and strike with full force. They are much more organised than the Hindus of any other province. The Muslim League dare not ignore their strength. To do so would be courting disaster.

During the Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations a strong wave of resentment had swept all over the Hindu Bengal against Gandhi Ji's offer to Jinnah. Meetings were organised, resolutions were passed, and demonstrations were held to protest against Gandhi Ji's acceptance of the principle of Pakistan. Not to talk of Hindus only, even some of the Muslims protested against Gandhi Ji's acceptance of the principle of partition. Amongst the many resolutions passed in numerous meetings in Bengal, there were many by eminent lawyers, and constitu-

tional Pandits. One statement issued over the signatures of about 250 barristers and lawyers of Bengal, expressed the disapproval of Gandhi Ji's offer in the following words :—

" The Hindus and Muslims of Bengal belong to the same racial stock. In spite of the differences recently sought to be accentuated by sections of disruptionists; encouraged by the unfortunate Communal Award, there are innumerable economic, social and cultural contacts between the two communities in Bengal. From the experience the people of Bengal have had of the administration carried on in this province since the introduction of the Communal Award, they are convinced, that Pakistan in any shape or form or the vivisection of the Motherland will not bring about any real concord or secure freedom for India."

The Hindus of Punjab expressed their resentment against Raja Ji's offer to Mr. Jinnah, in a resolution passed at a meeting of the two hundred prominent Hindus of the province held on August 13, at Lahore. The resolution on the subject ran as follows :—

" This representative conference of the Hindus of the Punjab, records its strong and emphatic protest against the vivisection of India as contemplated in the formula of Mr. Raj Gopalacharia.

This Conference is definitely of the opinion that since the enforcement of the Communal Award, the political situation in the country has immensely deteriorated.

This Conference is, therefore, convinced that the solution of the present political or communal deadlock in the country does not lie in yielding to the ever-increasing demands of Mr. Jinnah, and to the Muslim League, but in boldly and strongly resisting it by all available constitutional means.

This Conference further believes that political salvation of India can only be achieved by freeing its future constitution

from the virus of separation and communalism and basing it on truly democratic principles.

It further declares that Mr. Raj Gopalacharia's formula strikes at the root of fundamental geographical, cultural, and historical oneness, national integrity and administrative unity of India by proposing the dismemberment and vivisection of the country. The said formula by virtually accepting the two-nation theory of Mr. Jinnah on the basis of religion tends to destroy the noble achievements towards the evolution of one common Indian nation on the basis of racial identity, historical tradition and patriotic sentiments.

The offer of Mr. Raj Gopalacharia *is wholly* unauthorised, most inopportune, and absolutely unjust, adversely affecting the cultural, economic and political life of the Hindus. *The conference declares that nobody has a right to barter away the rights of the Punjab Hindus, and declares* that any such proposal shall be strictly resisted."

The Hindus of minority provinces feel that they would be wiped out of existence if Pakistan is allowed to be established. No doubt they are looking at the problem of Pakistan from a selfish and narrow point of view. But their fears and apprehensions are perfectly justified. What has happened in Bengal and the Punjab, where they have been reduced to the status of the hewers of wood and drawers of water, was enough to make them look at Pakistan with suspicious eyes, but what has happened in Sind, where the Muslim League Ministry has put a ban on " Satyarath Prakash", the sacred book of the Arya Samajists, has left not a shadow of doubt in the minds of the Hindus that neither their culture nor their religion would be safe in Pakistan. Whether this apprehension is right or wrong is another point. But the fact is that to-day no Hindu, except of course a few communists, is prepared to tolerate Pakistan. In all the Muslim majority provinces, the

minorities are preparing to fight over the issue of Pakistan. Nobody can to-day prophesy, whether Pakistan will at all come into existence. But whenever it may come, it will certainly be preceded by a lot of bitterness and blood-shed.

SIKHS

Next to the Hindus, the community that would be effected most by the establishment of Pakistan are the Sikhs. It would rather be more appropriate to say that in a way the Sikhs would be effected much more than even the Hindus. The Hindus of minority provinces, if they so choose, can migrate to majority provinces. Sikhs can not. The Punjab is their holy land. Their culture, their religion, their civilization, every thing was born and bred in this province. The Punjab to the Sikhs is, what the Palestine is to the Jews. It is for this reason, that the Sikhs seem to be more determined than the Hindus to oppose Pakistan. Amongst the Hindus we can still find a few who are prepared to concede Pakistan to the Muslims. Shri Raj Gopalacharia is the leader of this group amongst the Hindus. Their following is insignificant, but their existence can not be denied. But amongst the Sikhs, except the communists, who are today out to placate the Muslim League at any cost, there is not one responsible Sikh who is prepared to tolerate Pakistan in any shape or form. Their opposition to, and abhorrence of the scheme of Pakistan can be measured by the following words uttered by Master Tara Singh, the veteran Sikh Leader at the Press Conference called by him at Simla after the failure of the Leaders' Conference. Reiterating his determination to oppose Pakistan, Masterji said :—

" I would oppose the establishment of Pakistan, and would be willing for a civil war, if necessary. The Punjab was their homeland, and they wanted a state including the Sikh *territory. If Palestine could be homeland of ten*

per cent. of Jews, who lived there, surely the Sikhs had a much greater right, and claim in the Punjab, where their religion was founded, and they had most of their holy places."

Masterji's opinion reflects more or less the opinion of the entire Sikh community. The Sikhs will not tolerate Pakistan. They can accept it only on the condition that a separate independent Sikh State is carved out in the Punjab. This would mean liquidation of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah is fully conscious of it, and that is the reason why he is not prepared even to entertain this suggestion.

Pakistan without the consent and connivance of the Sikhs is an impossibility. Penderal Moon has summarised the whole situation beautifully when he says :—

" As regards Pakistan or the North-West Muslim area, the presence in the Central Punjab of the vigorous Sikh community is a serious complication. The Sikhs can not forget their past history. Beginning as a mere reformist sect of Hindus, they were turned into a distinct, self-conscious, militant community by the persecuting zeal of Aurangzeb. After long years of resistance to Muslim oppression and of guerilla warfare against Muslim Govenors, they ultimately emerged under Ranjit Singh as masters of the Punjab ; and they were its rulers immediately before the British annexation. This being their past history, Muslim domination is as repugnant to them as Hindu domination is to the Muslims. This reaction to a Pakistan run by Muslims is the exact counterpart of the Muslim reaction to a United India run by Hindus. It is by no means certain that any concession would reconcile them to becoming a minority in an Independent Muslim Pakistan ; and as they are a compact, well organised, vigorous community, any attempt to incorporate them in a Muslim state against their will would be forcibly resisted. Yet to exclude them from Pakistan, and include them in Hindustan

means finding a frontier somewhere in the middle of the Punjab ; and this seems impossible. Geographically, economically, racially and linguistically the Central Punjab is one. There is no natural dividing line. Any boundary bisecting it in the middle would be wholly artificial. It might conceivably serve as a mere administrative boundary between two units of a single federation, but not on the Frontier between two independent national states."*1

In conclusion Mr. Moon says :—

" But at present there is no indication that the Sikhs are tempted by or have even envisaged the prospect of inclusion in Pakistan on such terms. And until the Sikhs have agreed to inclusion, the practicability of the whole scheme must be regarded as doubtful."*2

This sums up the position of the Sikhs *vis-a-vis* Pakistan. Nothing further need be said on this aspect of the problem.

Amongst the non-Muslim minorities, besides the Hindus and the Sikhs there are Christians and Parsis also. Parsis are too insignificant a minority, and the Christians do not count collectively, as they are scattered all over the country. They can not play any effective part in deciding the issue of Pakistan, but the fact that they are also opposed to the establishment of Pakistan should lend added support to the demand of non-Muslim minorities that Pakistan should not be allowed to come into existence.

Sometime ago a statement was made in the House of Commons by Mr. C. R. Atlee, the present Premier of England regarding the rights of the minorities in the following words :—

" There are a number of extremely effective minorities who must be considered. There are the Sikhs, the Parsis, the Princes and the population of Indian States."

*1. Penderal Moon—" Strangers in India " p. 113.

*2. Penderal Moon—" Strangers in India," p. 113.

In reply to this a statement was issued under the signatures of prominent Parsis of Bombay like Mr. D. N. Bahadurji, ex-Advocate-General of Bombay, Dr. M. D. Gilder, ex-Minister, Dr. P. C. Bharucha, Mr. K. F. Nariman and others. The statement ran as follows :—

" Following the lead given by our great leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji, Sir Pherozshah Mehta, and Sir Dinshah Wacha, we Parsis have always asserted that we are Indians first and have asked for neither separate representation in Legislative or Municipal bodies nor any special treatment in the services. This was our stand even at the Round Table Conference. Mahatma Gandhi made a special reference to this and said that the Parsis formed the only minority that never asked for separate representation. May we now emphasise that in these days it is absolutely essential that we should stand by this self-same principle and policy. Expediency and policy apart, on moral grounds we clearly see that our future is indissolubly linked with that of our sister communities."

Sentiments expressed in this statement require no comment They reflect the re-actions of the Parsi community to the separatist tendencies in Indian politics.

The opposition of the depressed classes to the Pakistan Scheme was voiced in a resolution passed by the All-India Depressed Classes League, rejecting Cripp's offer. The resolution declared in clear terms that—

" While it is apparently gratifying to note that the proposal concedes the rights of the country to frame her constitution through the constitution-making body, there is a very subtle move to impair the integrity of the country for all times. The right of accession of any province to the Indian Union envisages India divided in herself and her people constantly fighting among themselves. This device will only act as a stimulus for communal and sectional animosities and will prove detrimental to the progress of the poor people. The

ago, during the Eighth Annual Session of the All-India Momin Conference held in Delhi, they decided to call upon Momins to resign from the Muslim League and the Congress. Mr. Zahir-ud Din, the President of the Conference, explaining this decision at a Press Conference stated that the Momins did not wish to be charged with being tools of any party and would develop their independent strength. He added that the Momins who numbered 45 millions would line up with any party which aimed at the immediate attainment of independence but not with any party which was an obstacle to its attainment. Summing up the stand taken by the Momins Mr. Zahir-ud-Din said :—

" We are convinced that Hindu-Muslim unity can wait, but, Swaraj can not wait. We are also convinced that the backward condition of Muslims will improve only after freedom is obtained. We are the depressed classes of the Muslims, and we do not expect justice from the Muslim League which represents monied and landed interests. We can not forget that for centuries under the Moghal rule the Syeds and the Pathans would not sit on the same bench with us, and we were not admitted into their schools. The same attitude persists among the Muslim upper classes to-day. I was for ten years the President of the District Muslim League, Ambala, and resigned about two years ago, because the League does not wish to do anything for the poor. In the Punjab, for instance, we are declared a non-agricultural tribe and can not buy land and take to cultivation."

Defining Momins' attitude to Pakistan, Mr. Zahir-ud-Din said :—

" If Pakistan is demanded by the Muslim League it will prove detrimental to the interests of the Mussalmans. The Muslim minorities in Hindu India will become like Moplahs

and the Hurs, and I am confident that the Pakistanists will not come to the aid of the Muslims in minority provinces."

Besides the Shias, and the Momins, the communal minorities amongst the Muslims, there are political parties like the Majlis Ahrar, the Muslim Majlis, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and others, who have openly and persistently opposed the idea of Pakistan. They consider Pakistan detrimental to the best interests of Mussalmans. The views of this school of thought amongst the Muslims, found expression in the following words, incorporated in the manifesto issued by the Muslim Majlis :—

" The present all-round frustration of our national and economic life points out clearly the interdependence of Hindu-Muslim problems, which have been made vexatious and almost insurmountable by the political opportunists in India. The attempt to create geographical barrier has been a gigantic political blunder on the part of its propounders. While the whole world is improving upon the most advanced ideas of political solidarity, enslaved India is being compelled to commit suicide in the name of Pakistan.

It is no use suppressing the fact that the majority of the Muslims in India have been living a deplorable life of stagnation since the fall of their empire. Their mental degradation is mainly responsible for their backwardness in politics. The Muslim leaders have always thought more of themselves, and the common Muslims have all along been exploited. The self-styled leaders made them constantly feel that they had been deprived of their legitimate rights and privileges by the Hindus. But they were never induced to aspire for the freedom of their country."

" After the Great World War, when the mighty problem relating to the desecration of the Holy Islamic places and the 'Khilafat' question stepped into the politics of the Musli

India, the selfish and reactionary leaders lost control of the Muslim masses for a period. But this period of mass awakening was not allowed to live long. The reactionary leaders slowly and stealthily again caught hold of a large number of Muslims in their grip.

" Mr. Jinnah's leadership of the Muslim League is one of the numerous links of the reactionary chain of the selfish and self-styled leaders. He is, indeed one of those leaders who have blocked the way to the goal of freedom and national unity. As long as such leaders are allowed to reign supreme, there is no chance of any compromise among the two great communities in India, and there is no chance of attaining freedom of the country. This reactionary leadership is a powerful weapon in the hands of the British Government to resist the aspirations of 400 million people in their struggle for freedom. We must make an end of reactionary leadership to save our community from its baneful effects."

CHAPTER IV

"Pakistan-Economic Aspect."

No study of the Pakistan issue can be complete without a dispassionate examination of the political, social and economic aspect of Pakistan. So far, not even the Muslim League has tried to look at this question from economic point of view. Its whole case for Pakistan has been built on mere sentiments. But sentiments do not pay in the long run. A community which thrives on mere sentiments, and carves out a plan for itself without caring for the hard realities of the present and the future is bound to go to the wall sooner or later. Mr. Jinnah says that they will have enough time to think of these things once they have acquired the territory. But suppose after acquiring it, they find that they are no way better off in Pakistan than they were in Hindustan, what will be the fate of millions of Mussalmans, who will follow Mr. Jinnah into Pakistan. Is it not, therefore, fair and proper that every aspect of Pakistan should be fully thrashed out, before the Muslims take their final plunge. Economic aspect, therefore is the most important aspect, and any study of this problem will remain incomplete without taking into consideration the economic side of this question. Political and economic independence go hand in hand. As a matter of fact, some people believe that economic freedom is more important than even political freedom. As the Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison has put it :—

" But it does not mean that others also should keep quiet over it. Every well-wisher of India has a right to go into the question. Let us, therefore, apply our minds to it.

We are indebted to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar for throwing much light on the economic aspect of Pakistan. From the studies that he had made of the subject, he has arrived at the conclusion that—

" The resources of Hindustan are far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers the question in terms of area, population, or revenue."*1

This view finds concurrence in many other quarters also. Many eminent Indian economists and some European and American politicians have also supported this view. They are of the opinion that Pakistan as a whole will certainly be weaker than Hindustan. Some of them hold the view that Pakistan can hold its own, provided the defence expenditure is shared jointly by Hindustan and Pakistan. All the leading Indian economists are of the view that Pakistan can not possibly bear the expenditure of running a strong and stable internal government, and at the same time defending the country from foreign aggression. Prof. Reginold Coupland expressing his views on the subject says :—

" It appears, then, that the greatest difficulty of Pakistan and its gravest risks lie in defence. If the probabilities discussed above are really probable, it would have to face the prospect of defending the N.-W. Frontier without the help of Hindu India ; and to do that on any thing like the same scale as it was done before the war, even without considering the increased cost of modern armament, would be far beyond its powers. Even to raise a substantial fraction of the money needed would require such extra taxation on the one hand and

*1. B. R. Ambedkar— " Thoughts on Pakistan," p. 65.

such drastic cutting down of administrative costs and social services on the other as would greatly lower the general standard of living and not only render the backward masses of the people still more backward, but doom them to that state for years to come. And that might not be all. Might there not be some anxiety as to the safety of Pakistan's Eastern Frontier too ?*1

Prof. Radha Kamal Mukerjee putting forward his well considered opinion against the partition of India says :—

" Without unity of the whole country, economic planning will be difficult, and agricultural Hindus and Mussalmans will be in greater misery, and imprisoned in their 1 to 2 area holdings, will fight more bitterly with one another. Without unity India can not command the sympathy and confidence of other nations, nor obtain foreign loans on such terms as China would obtain. Without unity India will not be able to obtain nickel, tin, tungsten, lead, zinc and petroleum from Burma on favourable terms, for the development of our heavy industries for China will also be a competitor there. Without unity India can not protect her heavy metal and chemical industries by tariffs, against the more powerful western industrial nations, and her strong organized industries, textiles, iron steel, cement and sugar will die a premature death for lack of expensive home markets due to the imposition of tariffs."*2

Prof. K. T. Shah, the well-known Indian economist, summing up his reactions on the economic aspect of Pakistan, says :—

"Apart from the Punjab, all other units of the N.-W. block, likely to secede, are deficit units, and must continue to

*1. R. Coupland—" The Constitutional Problem in India," Part III, p. 95, 96.

*2. R. K. Mukerji—" An Economist looks at Pakistan," p. 24.)

remain so for long years to come. Both Sind and the N.-W. Frontier Province need annual subsidies running into eight figures even now to conduct their provincial economy. If they were independent sovereign states by themselves, as contemplated in the Muslim League Resolution; their resources will by no means increase substantially, but the liabilities most certainly will, even if they federate with the Punjab, can that unit spare enough to make up the very much enhanced deficit in the sister provinces? Would she like to, even if she were able to?*1

Lastly we would like to put forth the views of Sir H. P. Modi and Dr. John Mathai expressed by them in a memorandum submitted to the Sapru Committee. Summing up their views on the economic aspect of Pakistan which they have submitted in detail in their memorandum they say :—

(1) "Judged solely by the test of ability." (*a*) to maintain existing standard of living and (*b*) to meet budgetary requirements on a pre-war basis by excluding provision for defence, separation would appear workable on economic grounds.

(2) If, however, provision is to be made (*a*) for future economic development on a scale sufficient to raise the general standard of living to a reasonable level and (*b*) for measures of defence which may be considered adequate under modern conditions, any scheme of political separation which may be contemplated should, as a necessary pre-requisite, provide for means of effective and continuous co-operation, between the separate states, in matters affecting the safety of the country and its economic stability and development. If such co-operation did not exist the position of both Pakistan and Hindustan might be seriously jeopardised."

*1. K. T. Shah—"Why Pakistan & Why Not," p. 107.

A strong plea for the maintenance of economic unity of India has been voiced by the authors of the Bombay plan for the economic development of India. Laying special emphasis on this aspect of the problem, they say :—

"The maintenance of the economic unity of India being, in our view, an essential condition of any effective planning we have assumed for the purpose of our plan that the future government of India will be constituted on a federal basis and that the jurisdiction of the Central Government in economic matters will extend over the whole of India. We should, however, explain that this does not preclude the possibility of a regional grouping of provinces as an intermediate link in a federal organization. Such regional grouping will not disturb the economic unity of India, provided that, in important matters effecting economic development the authority of the Central Government is not impaired. We draw attention to this aspect of the problem because we think that no development of the kind we have proposed will be feasible except on the basis of a central directing authority which enjoys sufficient popular support and possesses the requisite powers and jurisdiction."

Indian economists, industrialists and financiers have all with one voice given their verdict against the partition of India. As a matter of faet no Indian of any standing has approved the idea of Pakistan on economic and financial grounds. The opinions that we have quoted above have been expressed not by any anti-Pakistanist Congressman or by any staunch Hindu Sabhaite, but by the people who are impartial and have an open mind on the subject. They are not attached to any political organization. As a matter of fact, some of them, like Dr. B. R. Ambedkar are in favour of the partition of India if that could solve the communal problem.

he weakness of Pakistan Scheme from the economic point f view is so evident that no supporter of the scheme has dealt with it seriously so far, from the economic point of view. They have generally evaded this aspect, and that is one of the reasons why no complete and scientific study of this problem has so far been presented to the public by the Muslim Leage. The Muslim League's silence on this subject is quite significant and full of meaning for those who can see.

Let us now consider in detail the economic aspect of Pakistan. For this study it would be convenient to divide it into two parts :—

(1) Economic resources of Pakistan.

(2) Military requirements of Pakistan.

Let us first take up the question of economic resources of Pakistan. According to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the following could be the economic resources :—

Province	*Area*	*Population*	*Revenue Rs.*
N. W. F.	13,518	2,425,003	1,90,11,842
Punjab	91,919	23,551,210	12,53,87,730
Sind	46,378	3,887,070	9,56,76,269
Baluchistan	54,228	420,648	...
Bengal	82,955	50,000,000	36,55,62,485
Total	288.998	80, 283,931	60,56,38,326

RESOURCES OF HINDUSTAN

Provinces	*Area*	*Population*	*Revenue Rs.*
Ajmer-Merwara	2,711	560,292	21,00,000
Assam ...	55,014	8,622,251	4,46,04,441
Bihar ...	69,348	32,371,434	6,78,21,588
Bombay ...	77,271	18,000,000	34,98,03,800

Provinces		*Area*	*Population*	*Revenue*
C. P. & Berar	...	99,957	15,507,723	4,58,83,962
Coorg	...	1,593	163,327	11,00,000
Delhi	...	573	636,246	70,00,000
Madras	...	142,277	46,000,000	25,66,71,265
Orissa	...	32,695	8,043,681	87,67,269
U. P.	...	206,248	48,408,763	16,85,52,881
Total	...	607,657	178,513,919	96,24,05,206

Figures given above denote the resources of the provinces of Pakistan and Hindustan, as they exist to-day. But when, and if a constitution is drawn up on the basis of partition of *India* into two geographically contiguous independent and sovereign units, it will necessitate the exclusion of a portion of The Punjab and a portion of Bengal that will result in further curtailment of the revenues of Pakistan. To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues *of Pakistan and* Eastern Muslim state will be 60 crores minus 24 crores, *i.e.* 36 crores, the revenues of Hindustan will be about 96 crores plus 24 crores, *i.e.*, 120 crores.

Sir H. P. Modi and Dr. John Mathai *present* a *rather* different picture of the economic condition of Pakistan. Here are some of the figures given by them in their memorandum submitted to the Sapru Committee :—

THE BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE PAKISTAN PROVINCE, 1935-40

(Rs. in lacs)

Province		*Revenues*	*Expenditure*
Assam	...	2,93	2,92
Bengal	...	14,32	13,71

Province		*Revenues*	*Expenditure*
North-West Frontier Province	...	1,83	1,87
Punjab	...	12,11	11,49
Sind	...	4,29	4,05

The revenue of Assam, North-West Frontier Province and Sind, are inclusive of the subventions which since the inauguration of provincial autonomy in 1937, have been paid by the Central Government.

BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE PAKISTAN PROVINCES FORMED DISTRICT-WISE

The demarcation of Pakistan district-wise will effect Assam, Bengal and the Punjab. A rough estimate of revenue and expenditure of these provinces will be as under :—

(Rs. in lacs)

Province		*Revenue*	*Expenditure*
Assam	...	88	88
Bengal	...	9,24	9,32
Punjab	...	7,21	7,08

CENTRAL BUDGET OF PAKISTAN

More important than the budgetary position of the provinces included in Pakistan is that of its Central Government. Assuming that Pakistan will be constituted without disturbing the existing provincial boundaries, the share of the Eastern and Western zones of Pakistan in the revenue and expenditure of the Central Government for 1939-40 is shown below—

NET REVENUE

(Rs. in lacs.)

		Eastern Zone	*Western Zone*
Customs	...	12,36·3	5,82·9
Central Excise	...	1,21·1	78·0

		Eastern Zone	*Western Zone*
Corporation tax	...	73·5	17·1
Other income taxes	...	2,97·5	1,50·4
Salt	...	2,07·6	1,19·1
Posts, Telegraphs, Currency and Mint	...	36·0	21·3
Railways, nct loss	...	140·8	1,118
Miscellaneous	...	1·6	19·8
Total	...	18,32·8	8,76 8

NET EXPENDITURE

(Rs. in lacs.)

		Eastern Zone	*Western Zone*
Civil Administration	...	2,03·1	1,45·8
Debt services	...	4,41·7	2,16·4
Superannuation allowances	...	65·5	40·7
Grants-in-aid to provinces		30·0	2,05·0
Other items	...	47·6	30·4
Total	...	787·9	638·3

In case the present boundaries of Pakistan are changed, new ones are determined district-wise, that is only those districts are included in Pakistan which have Muslim majority, the revenue and expenditure of Pakistan will be as follows :—

NET. REVENUE

(Rs. in lacs.)

		Eastern Zone	*Western Zone*
Customs	...	7,75·0	4,02·2
Central excise	...	75·5	53·8

		Eastern Zone	*Western Zone*
Corporation tax	...	46·0	12·0
Other income-taxes	...	1,86·5	1,03·7
Salt	...	1,30·0	82·2
Posts, Telegraphs, Currency and Mint	...	22·0	14·7
Railways net loss	...	83·5	77·2
Miscellaneous	...	1·0	13·6

CENTRAL BUDGET OF PAKISTAN COMBINED

Assuming that the Eastern and Western Zones of Pakistan instead of functioning as two independent sovereign States have a common central government, the budgetary position of Pakistan will be somewhat as follows :—

NET REVENUE

(Rs. in lacs.)

		Province-wise	*District-wise*
Customs	....	18,19·2	11,77·2
Central excise	...	1,99·1	1,29·3
Corporation tax	...	90·6	58·0
Other income taxes	...	4,47·9	2,90·2
Salt	...	3,28·7	2,12·2
Posts, Telegraphs, Currency and Mint	...	57·3	36·7
Railways net loss	...	2,52·6	1,65·7
Miscellaneous	...	21·4	14·6
Total	...	27,09·6	17,52·5

NET EXPENDITURE

(Rs. in lacs.)

		Province-wise	*District-wise*
Civil administration	...	3,48·9	2,27·4
Debt services	...	6,58·1	4,26·2
Superannuation allowances	...	1,06·2	69·0
Grants-in-aid to provinces	...	2,35·0	1,60·2
Other items	...	78·0	51·0
Total	...	14,26·2	9,33·8

Province-wise this shows a surplus of Rs. 12,83 lacs, which will be reduced to Rs. 8,19 lacs if Pakistan is formed district-wise

Prof. Raginold Coupland gives the following figures regarding the budgetary position of the central state of Pakistan :—

REVENUE (THOUSANDS OF RUPEES)

		Central	*Pakistan*
Customs	...	40,50,53	4,48,06
Excise	...	8,65,73	1,00,92
Corporation tax	...	2,03,72	15,28
Other income-taxes	...	13,74,44	1,21,10
Salt	...	8,12,04	76,65
Opium	...	50,89	...
Railways	...	1,37,32	1,50,60
Posts and Telegraphs	...	18,98	2,37
Currency and Mint	...	22,42	2,80
Other heads	...	1,03,20	18,87
Total	...	76,39,22	9,36,07

EXPENDITURE (THOUSANDS OF RUPEES)

(*1938-39*)	*Central*	*Pakistan*
Direct demand on revenue ...	4,23,60	51,49
Irrigation ...	9,24	7,02
Debt services (less interest receipts) ...	13,38,54	1,86,00
Civil administration ...	9,84,69	1,45,56
Civil works ...	2,19,58	10,83
Miscellaneous ...	2,04,32	33,13
Defence ...	46,18,00	...
Contributions and adjustments ...	3,06,32	2,05,00
Total ...	81,04,19	6,39,03

Defence expenditure in Pakistan has been omitted from the table. Without that substantial item it will be observed that Pakistan emerges from the calculation with a credit balance of about 2,97 lacs of rupees, or about £ 2·2 millions.*1

From whatever angle you may view it, Pakistan does not seem to be a practical proposition from economic point of view. In Dr. Ambedkar's view it will definitely be a deficit state, with no bright prospects of future economic development. Sir H. P. Modi and Dr. John Mathai hold that Pakistan would be able to maintain existing standard of living, and will also be able to meet budgetary requirements on a pre-war basis, excluding provision for

*1. R. Coupland—the "Constitution Problem in India," Part III, p. 90.

defence. But in their opinion if the general economic standard of the people of Pakistan is to be raised, and adequate arrangement is to be made for the defence and allied military requirements, then Pakistan will not be able to bear financial strain. For this co-operation between Hindustan and Pakistan is most essential. Prof. Coupland is also more or less of the same opinion.

Nobody can deny that the present standard of living of an average Indian is hopelessly low. No economic planning can stand a minute's scrutiny if it does not provide means by which the standard of living of the people can be raised. India's per capita income is probably the lowest amongst the advanced countries in the world. The authors of the Bombay plan for economic development have given us the following figures regarding the per capita national income of each country in 1931. It shows the disparity between India and other countries :—

PER CAPITA INCOME (IN RUPEES)

U. S. A.	...	1,406	France	...	621
Canada	...	1,038	Germany	...	603
U. K.	...	980	Japan	...	218
Australia	...	792	British India	...	65

No Government worth the name, except a military Dictatorship relying on military and police force, can function even for a day if it does not raise the standard of living of the people. Pakistan state if it is to have a smooth and successful running must have a strong financial backing. But almost all the eminent Indian economists, and some foreign intellectuals like Prof. Coupland and Prof. Charles Beharc of the Colombia University are of the decisive opinion that Pakistan will be economically and financially weak and unsound. Ultimately she will have to fall back upon some

foreign financial aid, and that will endanger her independence also. One of the cause which would lead to financial instability will be lack of enough mineral resources, resulting in industrial backwardness of the whole state. As Prof. Radhakamal Mukerjee has put it :—

"With a division of the country into Hindustan and Pakistan, Hindustan will have virtual monopoly of coal (90 p. c.), and iron (92 p. c.), considerable reserves of manganese, copper, and bauxite. But Pakistan both north-western and eastern will have only a little low grade coal, iron ore and a little bauxite. On the whole, its mineral wealth will be only about five p. c. of that of British India as a whole. The poverty of the Muslim masses, who have already a low standard of living and average expectation of life than the Hindu masses can only be relieved by rapid industrialization for which Pakistan would be in-constant and desperate need of the mineral resources of Hindustan. Assam coal with its excessive sulphur content can not be used for metallurgical purposes. In the Punjab the fuels are mostly lignites, coal fields far away from the iron ores or smelting works can not also provide an economic basis for the development of metallurgical industries. Bauxite, the essential raw material for the alluminium industry is not available at all in Pakistan, but good deposits (15;150 tons) in 1937 are available in Bihar and C. P. Mica indispensable for electrical industries is found only in Bihar and Madras, which produce about 109,000 cwt., the highest production in the world. Refractory materials are to be found mostly in Hindustan except a few in Assam and Baluchistan. Most of India's cement production also now comes from Hindustan. 1,684,115 tons of lime-stone, the raw material for cement were produced in Hindustan as compared with 361,481 tons in Pakistan in 1937. So far as the production of rock phosphates essential for manuring is concerned, it is confined to Singhbhum and T[illegible]nopoli[illegible]h

deposits of sulphur in Eastern Baluchistan may lead to the manufacture of ammonium sulphates for Pakistan agriculture." *1

Prof. K. T. Shah, another well-known figure in literary circles and an economist of international fame giving his reasons for considering Pakistan economically unsound, says :—

(*a*) "There would not be loss of area and population alone; but also of material resources in the shape of water for irrigation in a land with scanty rainfall, with its principal wealth consisting in agriculture; and of hydro-electric power potentiality through the withdrawal of the hilly regions in the north and the east of the province.

(*b*) Except for salt and some petroleum, not sufficient to make up for the absence of coal, the Punjab has very limited scope for industrial development.

(*c*) The Punjab, Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan are all poor in mineral wealth, indispensable for basic industries, and, therefore, for large scale industrialization.

(*d*) That these regions being all predominantly agricultural, their establishment as separate sovereign states mutually independent, is very likely to intensify their internal jealousies and give rise to water wars, tariff troubles, etc., etc.

(*e*) That the majority of these units,–Sind and the Frontier and Baluchistan—are financially speaking heavy deficit areas, where provincial autonomy is maintained only at the cost of substantial subsidies from the present Central Government of India; that these subsidies are unlikely to be available if and when the units separate from the main country to form their own separate sovereign states; and that on the contrary, the

*1. R. Mukerjee : "An Economist Looks At Pakistan," p. 20-21

amount hitherto paid on this account, will in fairness be claimed as so much advances of loans allowed to these parts of the common country, which on dismemberment of that common state, the remaining units would be entitled to demand repayment from the seceding units.

(f) The financial position of units like Sind, the Frontier, and even the Punjab would be very considerably worsened by their having to bear the full burden of debt incurred by Government of India on the collective credit of the benefit of these units, like irrigation, railways, roads, etc.

(g) The financial liabilities of Sind, for instance, would, for the above and other analogous reasons be very considerably increased. The material resources of that unit would be seriously effected adversely because of the separation from the main land or because of the conflicts with the immediate neighbours." *1

In conclusion we would like to quote the considered opinion of Prof. Charles Behre of the Colombia University. Besides Prof. Raginold Coupland, Prof. Behre is probably the only foreigner who has given thoughtful consideration to the problem of Pakistan. Since he is not attached to any Indian political party, his views should carry weight with those who want a dispassionate consideration of the problem. Says Prof. Behre :—

"India's division into Hindustan and Pakistan will give Hindustan command of most of the coal, the most important raw materials, while Pakistan possesses only oil reserves. Bengal's industry will almost certainly be doomed, and there will be a fatal shrinkage. If India is divided on the basis of religious populations, the Hindu

*1. K. T. Shah : "Why Pakistan & Why Not," p. 149-50.

state would be rich while the Muslim state will be conspicuously poor. Speaking generally, about 90 p. c. of India's coal and 92 p. c. of iron would be in Hindustan. Hindustan would have most of the alloy and subsidiary minerals."

In conclusion Prof. Behre says :—

" A united India would be in a position to command sympathy and confidence of other Governments and would ask for loans under international auspices at some such terms as those for which China will ask, but an India, and yet more so two Indias using their newly-won sovereignty to create terriff walls around the national borders would be a poor economic risk. It is possible the investers would demand the gambler's percentage. Once committed to an industrialization programme, India would rapidly find herself confronted with the problem of controlling her programme in the interests of all people instead of a few—a familiar task which agonized western nations for a century and which, of course, is already a component of Indian situation." *1

So the first and the most far-reaching result of the partition of India will be that Pakistan area will be deprived of a large amount of industrial resources. It will also be totally deprived of the financial help that it is at present getting from Hindustan. We cannot overlook the fact that in the North-Western Zone, three provinces out of four, *i.e.*, the N.-W. F., Sind and Baluchistan, are deficit provinces. Sind and the N.-W. F. are at present receiving yearly subvention of Rs. 1 crore from the Central Government. In case of partition they will be deprived of this source of income. We can not expect the Punjab to come to the rescue of these provinces. The Punjab is a surplus province, and can remain so in future also, provided there is no

* 1. Prof. C. H. Behre—" India's Mineral Wealth and Political Future " Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1943.

economic and financial bungling. But it will be too much to expect of this province, that it should help Sind and the N.-W. F. P. to the extent of Rs. 2 crores every year.

In proposed Eastern Pakistan too, we do not come across a satisfactory state of affairs. Recent Bengal famine is another proof of the economic instability of Pakistan. Bengal could be saved only because the whole of India came to her rescue. As a matter of fact, Bengal received more help from those provinces which might form Hindustan of the future, than from the Pakistan Provinces.

The treatment that the Punjab and Sind meted out to Bengal in this last crisis is too painful a story to be repeated here. Bengal famine is probably the greatest argument against Pakistan.

It is, therefore, obvious that lack of resources will curtail the industrial expansion of Pakistan. We can not ignore the fact that even at present industrial and financial supremacy in Pakistan area is with the Hindus. Capital is concentrated mostly in their hands. " The Hindus of the North-West Frontier Province for instance contribute 80 p. c. of income-tax. In Bengal nearly 3/4 of the revenue comes from them, while approximately 87 p c. of the legal, 80 p. c. of the medical, and 83 p. c. of the Banking Insurance and Exchange business is in Hindu hands." *1

What does this signify? It shows, even if there is partition of India the Muslims for a long time to come will not be able to wrest economic power from the hands of the Hindus. On the contrary, the Non-Muslims to maintain their very existence and to safeguard their interests might try to consolidate their economic and financial position still further. It is possible that they may be deprived of

*1. Communal Triangle in India, p. 217.

this advantage by the force of law, as has been done in the Punjab. In this province by one act of legislature land worth crores of rupees has been transferred from one community to another. This may happen in Pakistan also. But it would mean endless strife and civil war. In Pakistan the Muslims will, therefore, find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. If they allow the Hindus and the Sikhs to consolidate their economic and financial power, they will not be able to reap the harvest which they are dreaming of to-day. If they will try to wrest economic power from the hands of the Non-Muslims, there will be communal bitterness, and the Muslims will again find themselves face to face with the problem which is agitating their minds at present.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE.

The most intricate and important part of the whole problem is that of defence. It is so closely connected with the economic aspect of the problem that we can not divorce the one from the other. We have already given much thought to some of the economic aspects of the Pakistan Scheme. Let us now extend our consideration to equally essential aspect, the aspect of defence.

All the evidence at our disposal leads us to the conclusion that economically and financially Pakistan will be a poor state, with no substantial reserves to fall back upon. This economic instability becomes all the more evident when we consider the problem of defence. Most of the Pakistan territory will lie along the frontiers of India. Therefore, the question will arise—who is going to defend these frontiers and how? The Muslim League would say that the Mussalmans of Pakistan will defend their own frontiers. It is true that there would be no dearth of man-power in Pakistan. Even the present day army of India consists mainly of

people coming from these areas. The following figures show the phenomenal rise in the number of people in the Indian Army from the Pakistan Zones :—

Area and Communities	Percentage 1914	Percentage 1918	Percentage 1919	Percentage 1930
1. The Punjab, N.W.F.P. and Kashmir ...	47	46·5	46	58·5
Sikhs ...	19·2	17·4	15·4	13·8
Punjabi Mussalmans ...	11·1	11·3	12·4	22·6
Pathans ...	6·2	5·42	4·54	6·35
2. Nepal, Kumaon Garwal ...	15	18·9	14·9	22
Gurkhas ...	13·1	16·6	12·2	16·4
3. Upper India ...	22	22·7	25·5	11
(1) U.P. Rajput...	6·4	6·8	7·7	2·55
(2) Hindustani Mussalmans ...	4·1	3·42	4·45	Nil
(3) Brahmins ...	1·8	1·81	2·5	Nil
4. South India ...	16	11·9	12	5·8
(1) Marathas	4·9	3·85	3·7	5·33
(2) Madrasi Mussalmans...	3·5	2·71	2·13	Nil
(3) Tamils ...	2·5	2	1·67	Nil

*1

The figures quoted above indicate that in 1933 people from Pakistan areas had a predominance in the army. These

*1. "Thoughts on Pakistan," p. 75.

figures should have swelled after the commencement of the war, as nowhere in India campaign for the enlistment in the army was carried on with such great intensity as in the Punjab. But the facts as they are, reveal a different picture. It seems even in the army, people from Pakistan areas are losing their hold. Here are a few figures given by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons on July 8, 1942. These figures show the percentage of the Indian army recruited from each of the main provinces of India and the kingdom of Nepal :—

The Punjab	50 per cent
The United Provinces	15 ,,
The Madras Presidency	10 ,,
The N.-W. F. Province	5 ,,
The Ajmer and Merwara	3 ,,
Bengal	2 ,,
The Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Bihar and Orissa	5 ,,
Nepal	8 ,,

Figures for the religious groups were :—

Mohammadans	about 34 per cent
Hindus including Gurkhas	50 ,,
Sikhs	10 ,,
Other religious groups including Christians	6 ,,

But even if we concede the point that Pakistan is the home of martial races, and if Pakistan is established, militant people of this state will defend their newly-acquired territories with all their might. The question that remains unanswered and will defy any answer for a long time will be—who is going to finance the army in Pakistan ? How are the frontiers

of Pakistan going to be defended ? It is an important problem on the solution of which depends chiefly the future of Pakistan. This question cannot, therefore, be easily evaded. It is, as a matter of fact, the very foundation, on which the whole structure of Pakistan is to be built, and we can never erect a strong edifice on a weak foundation. Therefore, the first and the foremost question that must engage our attention should be—who is going to pay for the defences of Pakistan ? Before we reply, we must study the existing arrangement, and in this connection we should again be grateful to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar for supplying us necessary data. While discussing about the revenues of different provinces, Dr. Ambedkar has given a convincing proof of his contention that the bulk of the revenue of India is derived from provinces which will form part of Hindustan, and is spent on the defences of the area which will comprise Pakistan if there is division of India on the lines suggested by the Muslim League. Here are a few figures given by Dr. Ambedkar :—

" The Pakistan area which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian army can contribute very little to the Central Exchequer will be seen from the following figures :—

		Rs.
The Punjab	...	1,18,01,385
The N.-W. F. Province	...	9,28,294
Sind	...	5,86,46,915
Baluchistan	...	*Nil*
Total	...	7,13,76,594

As against this, the provinces of Hindustan contribute as follows :—

		Rs.
Madras	...	9,53,26,745
Bombay	...	22,53,44,247
Bengal*1	...	12,00,00,000
U. P.	...	4,05,53,000
Bihar	...	1,54,37,742
C. P. & Berar	...	31,42,682
Assam	...	1,87,55,967
Orissa	...	5,67,346
Total	...	51,91,27,729

"The Pakistan provinces, it will be seen contribute very little. The main contribution comes from the provinces of Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of India to carry out its activities in the Pakistan provinces. The Pakistan provinces are a drain on the provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little to the Central Exchequor butthey receive a great deal from the Central Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs. 121 crores. Of this about Rs. 50 crores are annually spent on the army. In what area is this amount spent ? Who pays for the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the Hindu provinces and is spent on an army from which the Hindus who pay for it are excluded.*2

Dr. Ambedkar, while trying to prove his contention that the bulk of the revenue derived from Hindustan provinces is spent on Pakistan provinces, lays social emphasis on his

*1. Only ½ revenue is shown because nearly ½ population is Hindus.
*2. B.R. Ambedkar "Thoughts on Pakistan" p. 94 & 95.

theory that the present constitutional and political structure of India is proving detrimental to the Hindus, and that they will, in any case, be better off if they accede to the partition demand of the Muslim League. Whether Hindus gain or lose by Pakistan is a debatable point. But there could be no two opinions about the view held by some very eminent economists that the Muslims will certainly be the losers if India is divided into two or more compartments.

The defence of India, at present is a joint concern of all India. Though man-power is supplied by Pakistan area, bulk of financial burden is borne by Hindustan provinces. In the Northern Zone of Pakistan three provinces out of four are deficit provinces, and they are carrying on because of the heavy subvention that they are receiving from the Central Government. In the event of partition of India this subvention will not be available. The supporters of Pakistan might say that in case of partition these provinces will retain the revenue that they are at present contributing to the Central Government. But what is that, and will it make up for the loss? The Punjab Governments' annual revenue is about Rs. 11 crores, out of which it contributes about Rs. 1 crore to the Central Government. Sind Government's annual revenue is about Rs. 3,70,29,314, while the Central Government raises about 5,66,46,915 from Sind. In case of partition Sind will not be called up to pay this sum to the Indian Central Government. But it does not mean that the Central Government of Pakistan will not demand its share of revenue, as is the case to-day.

The case of the N.-W. F. P. will be even worse. At present the N.-W. F. Province raises about Rs 1,89,83,548 as the provincial revenue. It contributes to the Central Government only Rs. 9,28,294, while it receives a subvention of Rs. 1 crore from the Centre, which it will not be able to

receive from the Central Government of Pakistan, as that Government will not be able to bear such a heavy financial burden. As far as Baluchistan is concerned, its entire administrative machine is run and financed by the Central Government. This area will remain for ever a liability in any case

The case of the Eastern Zone is somewhat different from the Northern Zone. In Bengal the annual provincial reuenue is about Rs. 12,76,60,892. The Central Government raises about Rs. 23,79,01,583 from that province. In the event of Bengal becoming an independent sovereign state, the revenue that the Central Government realizes at present will remain with Bengal. But Bengal has no man-power. Her present contribution to the Indian Army is practically nil. In the eventuality of a division of India she will have to build very strong defences on all the four sides of her frontier, on three sides she would be surrounded by Hindustan and on the fourth there would be sea. Moreover the Eastern Zone and Northern Zone of Pakistan are situated on two extremes of the country. There will be no link between the two, and in times of emergency they will not be able to come to the rescue of each other. Not to talk of defence, in other matters also, they will be of no help to each other, as has been demonstrated during the recent Bengal famine. Bengal would have been wiped out of existence if the Hindustan Provinces had not come to her rescue.

But the question before us is—will Pakistan be able to defend itself? Our reply is a definite "No." As has heen stated by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, in peace times out of Rs. 50 crores spent on the defence of India, a bulk of this amount is contributed by the Hindustan provinces. At present Hindustan provides money, Pakistan provides man-power. In case of partition, Hindustan will be none the worse. There are enough resources in Hindustan to build up a powerful Army. So

far Hindustan has lagged behind in contributing its due share of man-power, but the latest figures regarding the composition of the Indian Army, as given by Mr. Amery in the House of Commons reveal that this deficiency is also being made up and it is quite possible that in the near future the Hindustan Provinces might find their position in the Army stronger than it was before the War. We can not ignore the fact, that on account of the propaganda carried on by the Hindu Mahasabha in favour of militarization, a large number of Hindus have joined the Army. If there is still some antipathy amongst the Hindu youth, it is on account of the great influence of the Indian National Congress on the Hindu mind. Once the Congress withdraws the ban on joining the Army, and calls upon the youth of India to enlist in the Army, millions of Hindu youngmen will come forward and the present supremacy of the Pakistanists in the armed forces will disappear. Whatever the Muslim League may say, a proper and effective defence of India can only be carried on if India remains united and strong. Partition will necessitate the creation of new defences for both the countries. Hindustan will not find it difficult to meet the new requirements. But Pakistan will face the greatest difficulty in coping with the new situation. On one side she will be required to perfect her defences and on the other she will be in need of economic and industrial development. Will she have enough finances at her disposal to undertake both these difficult tasks at the same time ? We know her resources are not enough, and it has now been realized even by some of the prominent leaders of the Muslim League. It seems, they depend upon Hindustan to come to their help at any critical time. The question of economic self-sufficiency of Pakistan came to the forefront during the Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations. Choudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman,

a high light of the Muslim League High Command commenting on this aspect of the question said :—

" When Mahatmaji doubted the economic sufficiency of the whole area claimed by the Lahore Resolution as disclosed by him in one of his letters to the Quaid-e-Azam he could surely foresee that what he was conceding to his other brother will not and could not be a self-sufficient unit. Apart from the Muslim demand, it is in the interest of India itself that independent sovereign states in the North-West and East, when formed should not only be economically self-sufficient but also otherwise contented. Any attempt to eat away larger slices of Hindu population from Muslim zones is bound to be looked upon with suspicion and distrust by Muslims when there is a large Muslim population willing and ready to be governed by powerful Hindu majorities in Hindu zones."

Choudhari Khaliq-uz-Zaman in his statement has confessed that Pakistan cannot be economically self-sufficient unless some area of the Hindu zones is also attached to it. If one of the foremost leaders of the Muslim League thinks that Pakistan without some outside help cannot have a sound economic footing, then no further arguments are needed to prove our contention that Pakistan will be an economic absurdity. We know her resources are not enough, and if with these insufficient resources she will try to build a sound economic structure, there will be chaos, and her whole administration might be thrown out of gear. The supporters of Pakistan might say that they will seek the help of foreign financiers, and will get enough money to develop the resources of their country. They might succeed in this venture to some extent, but they will not achieve much success. Foreign investors will hesitate to invest their money in a country, of whose resources they are not very sure. And if some investors

come forward they in return will demand their pound of flesh by imposing impossible conditions. The result of all this manœuvering will be, that Pakistan for a very long time to come will remain attached to the apron strings of foreign finance. But if India remains united, all the burdens of Pakstan area will be shared by Hindustan, and Pakistan will enjoy the benefit of sharing all the resources of Hindustan, as is the case at present. It is, therefore, now time that the Pakistanists should think and pause before they take a leap in the dark. They must understand fully the implications of division of India. A vague, undefined, and economically unsound Pakistan will lead them to chaos, anarchy, and red ruin. As Dr. Shaukat-Ullah Ansari has brilliantly put it :—

" Hostile India on one side and Japan or Afghanistan or Russia on the other, the separated Pakistan is no match for any foreign invasion. It is bound to become a subject province of an Asiatic power. By partition India would become again what it was at the time of the British annexation. How the British won the Battle of Arcot in the Deccan and Plassey in Bengal would serve as an eye-opener to those who are dreaming of partitioning India on religious lines. Hydar Ali and Tipoo Sultan were crushed with Maratha help and the Marathas were crushed with the help of the Muslims and some of the Marathas themselves. Are we in the name of self-determination just as were done in Europe after the last war—to Balkanize India, to create nothing but a jumble of weak states which will be a prey to outside force ? The separation of Burma and its consequences, inspite of the fact that Burma was receiving the fullest help of the British Empire, are too obvious to need comment. By separation instead of creating a strong Asiatic power we shall be creating a breeding ground for fresh wars. The complexity of the relations between

Pakistan and Hindustan concerning delimitation of boundaries, defence of borders, financial adjustments, inter-commerce and communications, would afford ample scope for perpetual warfare. 'The realities of the security question call for only one answer—the unity of India."***

CHAPTER V

The Congress and Pakistan

WHATEVER Mr. Jinnah may say to the contrary it is now plain as a pike staff that Pakistan can never come into existence, without the consent and co-operation of other political parties in India. As far as the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Shromani Akalidal, the most organized political party among the Sikhs, are concerned, there can be no compromise on the issue of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, amongst the Sikhs, there is none except the communists who is prepared to tolerate Pakistan in any shape or form, and the communist Sikhs cannot deliver the goods on behalf of their community. The Punjab is the corner-stone of Pakistan, and Mr. Jinnah can never build his edifice of Pakistan without the consent or connivance of the Sikhs. Therein lies the weakness of his scheme. But the main political party that counts in Indian political affairs is the Indian National Congress. No political settlement or constitutional scheme can ever succeed which has not the backing of the Indian National Congress. Who does not know that the Govt. of India Act 1935, a most mischievous and retrograde creation of British Imperialism, failed simply because it failed to secure the support of the Indian National Congress. British diehard statesmen and diplomats in England, and their henchmen in India tried to make it a success in spite of the opposition of the Congress, but to-day it stands condemned by those very people who were loudest in declaring it a masterpiece of British diplomacy. Similarly, Mr. Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan can never take a concrete shape unless it wins the support of th

on Pakistan can therefore be complete without a thorough discussion of the Congress attitude towards this complicated problem.

The All-India Muslim League passed its fateful resolution on Pakistan in March 1940 in Lahore. The first authoritative reaction of the Congress to the Pakistan proposal was made known to the people of this country immediately after when the Indian National Congress met in its Annual Session at Ramghar. In the main resolution of the Session which was moved by Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, we read the following about the communal problem *vis-a-vis* the division of India.

" The Congress is further of opinion that while it will always be ready as it ever has been, to make every effort to secure communal harmony, no permanent solution is possible except through a constituent assembly, where the rights of all recognized minorities will be fully protected by agreement as far as possible, between the elected representatives of various majority and minority groups, or by arbitration if agreement is not reached on any point. Any alternative will lack finality. *India's constitution must be based on Independence, democracy and national unity, and the Congress repudiates attempts to divide India or to split up her nationhood.* The Congress has always aimed at a constitution where the fullest freedom and opportunities of development are guaranteed to the group and the individual, and social injustice yields place to juster social order."

This attitude was further supported by the President of the session, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who in the course of his presidential address raised his strong and powerful voice against division of India, when he said, Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the religion of the people here for several thousands

of years, Islam also has been their religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so also we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I shall enlarge this orbit still further. The Indian Christian is equally entitled to say with pride that he is an Indian and is following a religion of India, namely Christianity."

The next official pronouncement on the question of partition of India was made by the Congress Working Committee during the Cripp's negotiations. The Congress High Command is generally chory of entering into any controversy which might result in worsening the communal situation. Members of the Congress Working Committee, even at the risk of being misunderstood, generally prefer to keep silent on communal issues, unless forced by circumstances to act otherwise. In their resolution on Cripp's offer they had no option but to speak on the question of the vivisection of India, as Sir Stafford Cripp's in his draft proposals had accepted the principle of the division of India, and had given the right of secession to those provinces which wanted to go out of the Indian Union. Consequently, while pronouncing its verdict on the Cripps proposals the Working Committee had to deal with this grave problem also, and here it is what it said, "The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a province is also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity, and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the provinces, and which may well lead to further difficulties in the way of Indian States merging themselves in the Indian Union. The Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity, and any break in that unity, especially in the modern world, when people's minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federation, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless,

Congress, non-violence has been the sheet anchor of all the activities of this great national organisation With this non-violent background it is easy to understand the reluctance of the Congress to force any territorial unit to join the Union. The Congress would be proving false to all its professions of non-violence if it were to force the issue.

But it seems the rank and file of the Congress were not satisfied with this attitude of the Working Committee. They wanted to clinch the issue, therefore, at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Allahabad in April 1942, the following resolution moved by Mr. Jagat Narain Lal was passed by an overwhelming majority.

" The A.I.C.C. is of the opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different states and provinces and the country as a whole, and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

While giving permission to move the resolution the President, Maulana Abul Kalam, Azad opined that the resolution in no way contradicted the position taken up by the Working Committee at Delhi with regard to the question of the demand for partition of India made by the Muslim League and incorporated in resolution dealing with Sir Stafford's draft proposals. But passage of this resolution after the Delhi Resolution of the Working Committee created a confusion in the minds of a large number of people and they were not sure whether in view of Mr. Jagat Narain Lal's resolution the Delhi Resolution has lapsed or it still stood as the authoritative pronouncement of the Congress. Maulana Azad tried to clarify this point in the A. I. C. C. meeting at Allahabad But it seems, it did not

meet with the requirements of certain politicians. Consequently Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad wrote a letter to the Congress President on August 6, 1942, requesting for further clarification of this point. To this the Congress President, Maulana Azad, sent a reply on that very day in the course of which he wrote :—

"It was made fully clear by Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Nehru, and myself at the time, and I repeat it now that no part of the Delhi resolution to which you refer has in any way been affected or modified by any subsequent resolution of the A. I. C. C. In fact the Delhi resolution was confirmed by the A. I. C. C."

This view received further endorsement from Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru. He not only supported Maulana Azad, but in a way once again explained and clarified the Congress position regarding the division of India, when he wrote to Dr. Abdul Latif.

"It is hardly necessary for me to add anything to Maulana Azad's reply, which is fully authoritative. I need only say, if I may venture to do so, that I wholly agree with it.

The Congress, position in regard to the proposal to divide up India into two or more parts is that any such division will be exceedingly harmful to both parts, as well as to India as a whole. I am personally convinced that probably our Muslim friends in the North-West of India will suffer most from such a division.

India, as it is, contains nearly all the important elements and resources that can make her a strong and more or less a self-sufficient nation. To cut her up will be from the economic point of view, as well as others, a fatal thing, breaking up that natural economic unity and weakening each part.

The North will suffer most from this, because it is industrially not so advanced, nor does it contain some of the essential raw materials that are so necessary for a modern nation.

There are many other arguments against any division, but I need not go into them, as you are well aware of them yourself. There are, of course, also the sentimental, historical and psychological arguments, which, as you know, affect the people powerfully.

It is for all these reasons that there is a very strong feeling amongst us, and, we believe, amongst vast numbers of people in India, against any division of India All these arguments are re-inforced by recent world history, and in fact by the course of the war itself."

In the course of the same letter Pt. Nehru further elucidated the Congress point of view in the following words :---

"Thus generally speaking, the Congress stands firmly for the unity of India and for a federation with a great deal of autonomy for the Units. For this objective it works. Nevertheless, at Delhi it made it perfectly clear that if any territorial unit was *emphatically and clearly* of the opinion that it should break with the Indian Union, it should not be compelled to act contrary to its wishes. Naturally this would not be welcomed by us, and it would inevitably depend on certain geographical and other factors. That decision of the Congress Working Committee stands, and nothing has been said or done to modify or vary it in any way.

When Babu Jagat Narain Lal's resolution came at the A. I. C. C. meeting at Allahabad, this was made perfectly clear by the Congresss President, by me and others. The wording of that resolution expresses the general wish and policy of the Congress, which has been the basis of our constitution

and working ever since the Congress, came into existence. There is nothing really new in it. This resolution does not in any way override the Delhi resolution of the Working Committee. This is perfectly clear and beyond doubt."*1

With Maulana Azad's clarification and Pt. Jawahar Lal's elucidation, the stage was set for another friendly offer to the Muslim League. The All-India Congress Committee went a step further towards the solution of the communal problem, when in its resolution of the 8th August 1942, it consented to the proposal of vesting residuary powers in territorial units. Says the resolution :—

"The A. I C.C., therefore, repeats with all the emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the united nations, sharing with them the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite government representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its allied powers, and to promote the well-being and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. *The provisional government will evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This constitution according to the Congress view, should be a federal one, with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units and with the residuary powers resting in these units.*"

*1. The Pakistan Issue, pp. 117—119.

With the passage of this resolution, which was followed by the arrest of Gandhiji and the members of the Congress Working Committee, another chapter of negotiations was closed till a new one was opened with the public offer of the formula now going by the name of Syt. C. Raj-Gopalacharia. During all this period.no attempt could be made by the Congress to solve the communal tangle, as practically all of its important leaders were behind the bars. Mr. Jinnah had an excellent opportunity during all this time to create an healthy atmosphere for a solution of the communal problem. But he made the situation more difficult. By his utterances and writings he added fuel to the fire. He not only did not take the initiative to arrive at any settlement of the communal problem with the other parties, but spurned and treated with scorn all attempts to find a way out of the *impasse*. It is an undeniable fact that not even once during the last nine or ten years did Mr. Jinnah take any initiative to bridge the gulf between the different communities of this sub-continent. The Congress approached him again and again, but only to receive repeated rebuffs from him. The Hindu Mahasabha contacted him, but only to be snubbed by him. The Liberals requested him but only to be ridiculed by him. And the Sikhs negotiated only to be disappointed by him. As a matter of fact he has not made one positive or constructive contribution towards the solution of the communal problem. But others who have the interest of their Motherland nearest to their heart could not sit quietly with folded hands. Unmindful of the obstacles placed in their way by Mr. Jinnah on one side, and the British bureaucracy on the other, they decided to make a new move which was unfolded before us in the form of Raj-Gopalacharia's formula. This formula and the controversy to which it gave birth will engage our attention in the next few pages.

The background of Rajaji's formula can be traced to his resignation from the Congress Working Committee in April 1942. He was of the opinion then, as he is to-day that we must concede the Muslims the right of self-determination with all its consequences. He appealed to the Congress to satisfy the Muslim League's claims and aspirations. But the Congress found it difficult to go beyond declaring that :—

"The Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity, and any break in that unity, specially in the modern world when people's minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federation, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee can not think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."

But this did not satisfy Shri Raj Gopalacharia, and so he had to leave the Congress, and since then he has been making persistent efforts to bring about a rapprochment between the Congress and the Muslim League, and his formula was a part of that effort. As he himself has made it clear.

"Since April 1942, I strove to find a just and acceptable solution which would bring the Muslim League and the Congress together, and enable them jointly to assault the imperialist citadel. I have worked hard without fear or favour. I have tried to understand the case of the Muslims and the case of the Congress, and to be just to both the parties. This claim may not be accepted either by the Muslim League leader, or by the leaders of Hindu community. But I believe that impartial judges will see some justice in the claim." *1

It was in this spirit that Rajaji put forward his formula which we give below :—

*1. Preface to "Gandhi-Jinnah Talks," published by the *Hindustan Times*.

the formula had accepted the principle of partition of India. The Sikhs denounced it as they thought that the establishment of Pakistan would place them under the permanent communal domination of Muslims. The Liberals disapproved of it, as it cut at the root of Indian unity. The Muslim League condemned it as it did not go far enough to meet their claim. The Congressmen out of their loyalty to Gandhiji kept quiet, though majority of them did not approve of the idea of the partition of India. The extent of heat that this formula generated in the political ferment of the country can be gauged by some of the statements issued by the leaders of different political parties.

Mr. M. A. Jinha, the President of the Muslim League was probably most vehement in his denunciation of this formula. Speaking in a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League held at Lahore he said :—

"I have made it clear that the procedure and method adopted is hardly conducive to friendly negotiations and the form is pure dictation, as it is not open to any modification. This is not calculated to lead to fruitful results or a resolution and a settlement of the problem which concerns the destiny of a nation of hundred millions of Muslims and their posterity. Mr. Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan and thus trying to pass off having met our Pakistan Scheme, a Muslim demand."

The Hindu Mahasabha's reactions to this formula were reflected in a statement issued by Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, who in the course of a statement declared :—

"Gandhiji feelingly announced some time ago that India's unity was his article of faith, and if Pakistan is to come it will come over his deadbody. The arch magician of

problem of minorities accentuate it and will not be in the interests of the Muslims themselves."

The Sikhs opposition to this formula was reiterated in a resolution passed at a representative meeting of the Sikhs held at Amritsar on August 20,1944. The resolution on the subject says :—

"This Panthic gathering emphatically condemns the Gandhi-Raja formula for communal settlement and rejects it because as a result of its enforcement, the Sikhs will be divided into two sections to be held in perpetual bondage. Further this formula which would vivisect the country will undermine the unity and combined strength of the country and create conditions of permanent disunity and anarchy in this land. This Panthic gathering further declares that no communal settlement reached without the previous consultation with and without the consent of the Sikhs will be binding on them."

Master Tara Singh, the veteran Sikh leader giving his support to the above resolution said :—

"The C. R. formula was not acceptable to them as it would result in dividing the Punjab by putting 17 districts in the Pakistan and 12 districts with Hindustan. This would place the Sikhs under the perpetual slavery of the two, namely the Hindus and the Mussalmans. That, he asserted, the Sikhs did not want. The Sikhs also wanted political power. The Hindus did not want the division of India because it suited them to maintain their power in the centre. Mr. Jinnah was now trying to placate the Sikhs by offering them what he described "better terms." The Sikhs would refuse to live on any body's charity."

But undaunted and unmoved by this opposition Gandhiji and Shri Raj Gopalacharia decided to negotiate with Mr. Jinnah, because in Gandhiji's own words :—

"It was a contribution from two life servants of the nation towards the solution of the communal tangle which has hitherto defied solution. It was an open invitation to all parties to apply their minds to the solution. The Rajaji's formula is intended as a help to all lovers of the country. It is the best we could conceive, but it is open to amendment as it is open to rejection or acceptance."*1

It was in this spirit of service that Gandhiji inspite of vehement opposition from many quarters started his negotiations with Mr. Jinnah. A thorough perusal of Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence leads one to the conclusion that when Gandhiji was acting in a spirit of accommodation Mr. Jinnah was acting in a spirit of bargaining. Not once during the negotiations did he show any spirit of accommodation or compromise. He wanted Gandhiji to make certain commitments without committing himself in any way. That explains one of the reasons for the break-down of the negotiations. Before thrashing in detail the various issues raised and discussed, let us examine the main differences between the two leaders as revealed in their correspondence.

According to Gandhiji :—

1. Joint front for the independence of both Hindus and Muslims. Immediate unity for freedom in return for future exercise of the right of partition.

2. The exercise of the right of partition to be put to the test of the peoples will be through a plebiscite. A vast mass of congressmen doubt if the majority of the Muslims really wants partition.

3. To insure that just boundaries emerge out of the plebiscite of the entire people. Thus if the Muslim majority has its way the minorities too will have their way.

*1. Gandhiji's statement dated July 30, 1944.

4. Previous agreement that the matters of common interest will be administered by mutual agreement. If the brother is so unreasonable as to demand partition, obtain a previous guarantee that he will not run riot.

According to Mr. Jinnah—

1. Acceptance of the right of complete independence of Muslim India, *i. e.* the right to form an independent sovereign state.

2. Recognition of the above right to form the basis of a joint front between the Congress and the League for winning freedom both for Pakistan and Hindustan through their joint efforts,

3. Boundaries between the two states to be settled by mutual agreement.

4. Two separate constitution-making bodies to draft the constitution of the two states.

5. Future relations between the two states to be defined by treaties between them as between two independent states. The main points of cleavage between the two leaders were the following :—

1. Right of selfs-determination.

2. Pakistan—before freedom or after.

3. Plebiscite.

4. Are Hindus and Muslims two nations ?

5. What are to be the boundaries of Pakistan and Hindustan ?

Right of self-determination :—

One point, which has been repeatedly stressed by the supporters of Pakistan, and which found enough prominence during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks, is that the principle of the right of self-determination gives the Mussalmans the right to

form independent states. It was this point on which Mr. Jinnah put special emphasis before Gandhiji. When in one of his letters he wrote :—

"It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word 'self-determination.' We claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation which is our birth right."

Seemingly Mr. Jinnah's demand of Pakistan is based on the right of self-determination. But there seems to be a world of difference between his conception of self-determination and that of the Congress. Right of self-determination is essentially a democratic process. Though in political affairs, specially national and international matters, it is generally exercised by a community or a nation, yet it envisages the right of every individual to exercise his free and unfettered will to choose his own form of govenment. E. H. Carr in his thesis on the, 'Future of Nations,' explaining the right of self-determination says :—

"The principal of self-determination strictly defined requires that a group of people of reasonable size desirous of constituting a state should be allowed to constitute a state.

But this proposition as enunciated in the 19th century, more often took the form that a 'nation' had the right to constitute a state."

Explaining it further, Carr says :—

"The recognition of the right of self-determination for nations thus involves the question, what nations? And this question requires not a theoretical general answer but particular answers based on the facts of particular cases. In the last resort the only rights are the rights of men. In order to

assert the right of a nation to self-determination, we must first inquire in what sense the men on whose behalf the claim is made are a nation, and what kind of rights they want to claim. The problem is one of great difficulty and of immense practical importance."*[1]

According to Carr's definition of the right of self-determination, the only rights to be taken into consideration are the rights of men. And what are those rights? Freedom of expression of opinion is one of the fundamental rights of man, and no state has a right to exist which deprives the people of this basic right of citizenship. Viewed from this point of view, the Congress accepted the Muslim's right of self-determination long ago, when in its Delhi Resolution of April 1942 it declared :—

"The Committee can not think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."

It was in the light of this declaration by the Congress that Gandhiji suggested to Mr. Jinnah that predominantly Muslim areas can exercise their right of separation if the majority of the inhabitants of that area declare in favour of separation through plebiscite. But Mr. Jinnah would not agree to it. His conception of the right of self-determination is wholly different from that of the Congress. While Gandhiji and the Congress want the Muslims to play an active part in shaping the future constitution of India, Mr. Jinnah merely wants them to become passive pawns in the game of power politics. The Muslim League has made a great show of the principle of the right of self-determination. Mr. Jinnah says that the Muslims claim this right as a nation and not as a territorial unit. This is simply begging the question. The Muslims want the right of self-determination to form a sovereign state, and

*1. E. H. Carr, 'the Future of Nations,' p. 21.

one of the arguments they put forward is that they are numerically in majority in certain parts of the country and, therefore, they have a right to form those states into independent sovereign states. They would not have dared to put forward this claim of self-determination if the Muslims had been scattered all over the country without numerical majority in any province. We have the depressed classes amidst us. They are no less than eighty millions, almost the size of the Muslim community, and yet they have not put forward such a claim. In the Punjab, the Sikhs also claim that they are a nation. This claim has been rejected by the Muslims, and one of the reasons given is that the Sikhs are not in majority in any part of the province. It is, therefore, absurd to say that the Muslims claim the right of self-determination only because they are a nation and not as a territorial unit. It is simply playing fast and loose with the principle of self-determination. M. Stalin to-day is probably the greatest exponent of the right of self-determination for the nations. He has not only preached but practised also. Let us see what he says :—

"A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of the fact that people live together from generation to generation. But people can not live together for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and here in the new territory, in the course of the time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of territory led to the formation of different nations. Thus community of territory is one of the characteristic features of a nation."*1

It is, therefore, as plain as a pike staff that the right of

*1. M. Stalin—"Marxism and the Question of Nationalities p. 5.

self-determination can be granted to a community constituting a territorial unit. But the right of self-determination for a community or a nation implies the right of every individual constituting that nation to express his or her voice in the governance of his or her country. In other words, there should be a free plebiscite to implement the right of self-determination. But it is this very test that the Muslim League wants to evade. Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League are leaning on broken reeds when they oppose the demand for plebiscite. *The Hindustan Times* has put it rightly when it says :—

"The Muslim League Resolution has not been at any time or any form affirmed by the people on whose behalf the claim for separation is made. The League may represent Muslim opinion, but this particular demand is too big a change to be accepted without expressly putting the question precisely and by itself to the people, and obtaining their affirmative answer thereto. Even if a majority of Muslims throughout India agree to it, it would not be fair to assume that the majority of the people of the area to be delimited according to the terms of the resolution demanded. The demand should be specifically ported by the majority of the people living in that region."

But Mr. Jinnah is opposed to it. He wants the right of self-determination for the Muslims but would not let them exercise that right by a free plebiscite. Gandhiji and the Congress gave that right to the Muslims long ago, and Gandhiji repeated it again, when in his letter to Mr. Jinnah dated 24th September 1944 he wrote :—

"Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore of 1940 on the basis and on the following terms :—

The areas should be demarcated by a commission approved by the Congress and the League. *The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the vote of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.* If the vote is in favour of separation it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can, therefore, be constituted into two sovereign independent states."

This offer was rejected by Mr. Jinnah. In his view the non-Muslims have no right to have any say in the establishment of Pakistan. He has repeatedly said, that the state of Pakistan will be founded on freedom and democracy, and yet he wants to disfranchise the non-Muslims from the very beginning. How does he expect the non-Muslims to have any trust or confidence in the Muslims, when the beginning of the new state of Pakistan is to be made with a very great initial disadvantage to them. With this attitude of his Mr. Jinnah has banged, bolted and barred the door to any compromise. Not to say of non-Muslims, Mr. Jinnah is not prepared even to trust his own co-religionists. He is opposed to the very idea of plebiscite thus destroying the very basis of a free and democratic constitution. He knows it well that the majority of the Valiant Pathans of the Frontier would never accept Pakistan. He is also conscious of the fact that the support of the Punjab Mussalmans is a doubtful proposition. In Bengal also he is not sure of a solid backing. He also realises that the nationalist Muslims, Red Shirts, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Ahrars, Shias, Momins, and many other groups amongst the Muslims are opposed to the idea of Pakistan. In the light of these irrefutable facts, Mr Jinnah's opposition to plebiscite is quite understandable. But then let him not talk of self-determination. The fundamental basis of self-determinatian for a community or a

nation is the right of every citizen to exercise his or her free and unfettered will to choose the form of government he or she likes. Mr. Jinnah is not prepared to give this right to the people, while Gandhiji and the Congress can not think of any political arrangement in which even a single citizen is deprived of his right to have his say in the formation of the government. It was for this very reason that they have been advocating the formation of a Constituent Assembly. Gandhiji could not put his case more forcefully when he said :—

"The rule of majority does not mean that it should suppress the opinion of even an individual if it is sound. An individual's opinion should have greater weight than the opinion of many, if that opinion is sound on merits. That is my view of real democracy".*1

Obviously, this is not Mr. Jinnah's conception of democracy. Hence the deadlock.

2. PAKISTAN—BEFORE OR AFTER FREEDOM.

Is the Pakistan issue to be decided before India is free, or after? This question was hanging fire throughout the Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations. While Gandhiji was of the opinion that the issue of communal settlement could be, and should be decided, after British power from India has been totally withdrawn, Mr. Jinnah was throughout emphatic that this question must be decided immediately. He was prepared to lend his support to the fight for freedom on the explicit condition that, not only the Congress should accept the Muslims right of separation, but should help them in forming and establishing two different independent states, and that too on the conditions to be laid down by the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah could never realise that the Congress could only be induced to support his demand for Pakistan on the condition that joint

*1. Gandhiji's statement dated 28th September 1944.

effort to secure freedom for India is to be the pre-requisite of any recognition of the right of self-determination. Shri Raj Gopalacharia made it clear, when in his formula he laid down the following conditions :—

1. "Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period.

2. These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India."

The reason why Shri Raj Gopalacharia incorporated these terms in his formula, were explained by him in the course of an interview at Madras on July 19, after the breakdown of his personal negotiations with Mr. Jinnah. To a question: "Will your offer be exploited to the disadvantage of the Hindu community without a settlement being made ?" Rajaji said:

"This question arises out of the fact that the nature of the problem has not been clearly understood. The offer we have made is not for any change in the administrative arrangements under the British rule. Had this been the case, Mr. Jinnah could, with the assistance of British Government, exploit our offer. What the League has asked for is independent sovereign status for a certain tract of the country wherein the Muslims are in a majority in contiguous areas. It is this we have offered to the Muslim League. If it does not ripen into settlement we shall remain where we are. If British control continues, and our status is one of subjection, there is no question of partition. United we shall stand in subjection. All divisions can only be then Provincial divisions. Our proposals can not be then exploited, for any purpose

detrimental to the interests of the country. You put this question because in the past, offers in respect of questions like separate electorates, separation of provinces and the like, were exploited. There was then no question of freedom from British control and this kind of exploitation was possible."

But it seems that Mr. Jinnah is determined to impede country's progress towards freedom unless the Congress is prepared to aceept his conditions. He does not seem to be interested in India's freedom. It looks rather strange that while on one hand Mr. Jinnah has stated that there could be no freedom for Hindustan or Pakistan unless the British power is withdrawn from India, yet he is not prepared to oust the foreign power unless his demand for Pakistan is conceded. His slogan of 'divide and quit', raised by him at the Annual Session of the Muslim League held at Karachi shows the real trend of his mind. He wants the British Government to first divide India and then quit. In other words, if there is no chance of the establishment of Pakistan, he would like the present state of affairs to continue. He has not minced matters in this respect. In the course of a statement issued by him, criticising Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's cable to Lord Wavell, he said :—

" Muslim India will not accept any attempt to change the present constitution in any way which would directly or indirectly be on the basis of United India. The question of Pakistan is the first and the foremost issue to be decided preliminary to any consideration or the framing of any future constitution."*1

But this contention of Mr. Jinnah was not acceptable to Gandhiji, and is not acceptable to the nationalist opinion either. Both Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah explain their points

*1. Mr. Jinnah's statement issued on April 2, 1945

of view in the course of their correspondence. Mr. Jinnah wrote to Gandhiji on 10-9-44 :—

" I think you realize, and will admit that the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question is the foremost and major hurdle, and unless the representatives of these two nations (Hindus and Mussalmans) put their heads together how is one to make any headway with it."

To this Gandhiji's reply was :—

" My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity, which I want for its own sake, but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling power being ousted. Hence the first condition for the exercise of the right of self-determination is the achieving of independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together."*1

But Mr. Jinnah will have no truck with such a proposal, and therefore he replied back :—

" This in my opinion is, as I have repeatedly said, putting the cart before the horse, and is generally opposed to the policy and the declaration of the All-India Muslim League." *2

The views of these two leaders represent two different currents of thought in Indian politics. They are diametrically opposed to each other. Hence no solution of the problem.

3. Are the Hindus and the Muslims two nations ?

The main point at issue between Mr. Jinnah and nationalist opinion has been and still continues to be the 'two-nation theory.' Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League have lately propounded the theory that the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations and that there is nothing common between the two. It is an irony of fate that Mr. Jinnah, who was once

*1. Gandhiji's letter to Mr. Jinnah dated 11-9-44.

*2. Mr. Jinnah's letter to Gandhiji d/ 11-9-44.

the greatest exponent of one-nation theory, and who had believed, that any distinction between the Hindus and Muslims in politics must go, is today the standard-bearer of the two-nation theory. Mr. Jinnah's views on the communal question were radically different in 1919 from what they are to-day. His evidence before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament in 1919 indicates the change that has come in his outlook. In the report of his evidence before this Committee we find the following illuminating views :—

Q. You said that you spoke from the point of view of India. Do you speak really as an Indian Nationalist ?

A. I do.

Q. *Holding that view, do you contemplate the early* disappearance of separate communal representation of the Mohammadan community ?

A. I think so.

Q. That is to say, at the earliest possible moment you wish to do away in political life with any distinction between Mohammadans and Hindus ?

A. Yes, nothing will please me more than when that day comes."

And yet Mr. Jinnah insists on the acceptance of his two-nation theory. What an unbridgable gulf separates him and his followers from the rest of their countrymen can be gauged by going through his correspondence with Gandhiji? Mr. Jinnah's main contention was that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations because they have different religion and different culture. How far acceptance of a particular religion can form the basis of a separate nation is a debatable point. Nowhere in the world has religion been accepted the basis of a nation. There is probably no country in the world, where people belonging to different religions do

not exist, and yet, nowhere except in this unfortunate land division of the country is demanded on the basis of religion. If Mr. Jinnah's contention be accepted the people of the countries like Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan be considered as members of one nation, because they all profess one religion. Similarly, the inhabitants of countries with Christianity as the chief religion should constitute one single nation. But the stark reality is that they are not. They have the same rivalries, and jealousies amongst themselves as the peoples of two different nations. As a matter of fact when the occasion arises, they are even prepared to cut each other's throat. Therefore there could not be anything more absurd and illogical than to say that religion should be considered the basis of one's *nationality*. Russia has been put forward as a model by the champions of the two-nation theory. But they forget that religion has no place in the present-day Russia. Different nationalities in Russia have been accepted not because the people of these nationalities belong to different religions but for some other reasons. It has been said that Muslim culture and customs are different from those of the Hindus. But is it not a fact that Muslims of different provinces have different customs and traditions? Surely, there is nothing common between a Muslim Pathan of the N.-W. F. P. and a Mohammadan of Bengal except religion. Therefore, Mr. Jinnah's contention is inconsistent and illogical. His views are not shared even by his co-religionists. Thus Dr. Shaukat-Ullah Ansari in his book 'Pakistan—the Problem of India,' says :—

"The assumption underlying the League attitude seems to be that all who belong to a religious group whether by the accident of birth or by the fact of choice, must, because of their common religious faith also hold the same political opinions about the form of government or structure of society

they wish to have. This assumption is without any basis. Almost all the peoples of Europe are Christian by faith, but political and economic conflicts there are more virulent than in any other continent. The Arabs are Muslims like the Turks, but they did not hesitate to co-operate with the Britishers who are Christians to throw off the Turkish yoke. Religious confirmity is one thing, identity of economic and political interests is another."*1

Clarifying his point of view further Dr. Ansari says :—

"Can it be said that the so-called constituent units of Pakistan really desire a union? The north-west region is undoubtedly an extensive tract, but apart from this and a common religion of majority of the inhabitants there is nothing that is common. There are at least five distinct and separate languages spoken within this area; and historically it can hardly be claimed that as a territorial unit it has ever been one unit detached from the rest of India. Those who will constitute this state, the Sikhs, the Hindus, the Muslims, the Pathans, the Punjabis, the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Kashmiris have more bitter memories of each others' dealings in the not very distant past than what perhaps exist in any other part of the country. More recently the spirit of provincialism has been significantly strong, as may be noticed from the resentment in Sind, Bahawalpur, Kashmir and the N.-W.F.P. against the Punjab on account of its dominating representation in their services to the detriment of their own people, in the same way as at one time the Punjab resented the preponderance of the Bengali element in their services."*2

Cogent and convincing arguments advanced by Dr. Ansari smash the basis of two-nations theory. We must admit

*1. S. Ansari. "Pakistan the Problem of India," page 59.
*2. S. Ansari "Pakistan and the Problem of India," page 63.

that India as constituted at present is one distinct nation, and any attempt to divide India will prove most detrimental to the best interests of the inhabitants of this ancient land. Before concluding consideration of this point we would like to place before the readers the refreshing and illuminating views of Sir Sultan Ahmad, a former member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Says Sir Sultan :—

"It is strange that Hindu-Muslim unity should be going to pieces in spite of the existence of so many common points between the Hindus and the Muslims. It should have been our duty to use these points for broadening the basis of unity. A common cultural heritage in music and literature, painting and architecture, was not the only treasure bequeathed to us. A common political destiny too was evolved as the Hindus and the Muslims fought together in many a battle. In social life, again the traditions and practices of the two communities were interwoven one with the other. Common ways of life were already in evidence even as early as the days of the Emperor Babar, who facetiously described them as "Hindustani ways," in which both Hindu and Muslim traits were found freely mixed up. Then came the Urdu language beginning as the language of the Camp. Even in religion, in those days, the most cherished of all things, the two influenced each other. The Muslim gave a new turn and a new tinge to the religion of the mass of Hindus; his own in turn took on an Indian complexion. This change was noted by his ultramontane co-religionists."*1

BOUNDARIES OF PAKISTAN.

What are going to be the boundaries of Pakistan? This is probably the most controversial aspect of the whole problem.

*1. Sir Sultan Ahmad "A Treaty between India and the United Kingdom," pages 60-61.

Even some of the non-Muslim supporters of Pakistan have repeatedly asked this question. They want a clarification of this point before they can extend their unqualified support to the Muslim League. But the reply given by Mr. Jinnah, and the position explained by some of the leaders of the Muslim League has convinced nobody. It has rather placed in an awkward position persons like Shri *Raj* Gopalacharia. They are prepared to accede to the demand of the Muslim League that the Muslim majority areas be constituted into a sovereign state, but they hesitate to lend support to the extra territorial ambitions of the Muslim League.

Let us examine this question objectively. According to the Lahore resolution of the Muslim League, "geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

The Muslim League Resolution lays stress on two points, namely: "Geographically contiguous units, and the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority." Both these points remained ambiguous and undefined till Shri ʻjgopalacharia through his formula forced Mr. Jinnah to come out with his conception of the Pakistan boundaries. As Gandhiji rightly put it, "the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it a shape." It was therefore, for the first time during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks, that the question of demarcation of boundaries came to the forefront. Mr. Jinnah in his letter dated 10-9-44, asked Gandhiji, who will appoint the

commission for the demarcation of boundaries, and who will give effect to their findings. And also what does Gandhiji mean by 'absolute majority'. Gandhiji in his reply stated that the commission will be appointed by the provisional government, and 'absolute majority' means a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan, or the Frontier Province. But Mr. Jinnah was not prepared to accept this proposition and therefore he wrote back on 25-9-44, that if Gandhij''s contention is accepted, " the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only the husk." It is clear that Mr. Jinnah wants the present administrative boundaries to continue. But this position can never be accepted by any sane and sensible person. Since the Lahore Resolution is vague on this point, to facilitate discussion and decision on the subject Rajaji gave it a concrete shape in his formula when he declared :—

" After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, where the Muslim population is in absolute majority."

Now this is the most just and equitable solution of the problem. Mr. Jinnah can demand the separation of only those areas where the Muslims are in a majority but by no stretch of imagination, and by no twisting and torturing of arguments can he force non-Muslims to remain in Pakistan if they choose to go out of it. Fortunately in the Punjab and Bengal there are certain districts which are geographically almost contiguous and have a non-Muslim majority. There is no reason whatsoever why the people of these districts be forced to remain in Pakistan. And there is no doubt that if the fifteen districts of Bengal and thirteen

districts of the Punjab with non-Muslim majority go out, Pakistan would be deprived of the most useful and fertile territory. Mr. Jinnah is perfectly right when he says that if Rajaji's formula is accepted there would remain, 'a shadow and a husk, maimed, mutilated and a moth-eaten Pakistan.' But he must blame himself for the situation. He can, on no account, be allowed to grab the territory in which the Muslims have no majority. As a matter of fact Mr. Jinnah is going beyond the scope of the Lahore Resolution in demanding the acquisition of non-Muslim areas — the Lahore Resolution clearly lays down that only those areas be made, 'sovereign and independent states' where the Muslims are numerically in a majority. But Mr. Jinnah is going beyond this. Let him realise that whatever may happen he will never be allowed to acquire those districts of Bengal and the Punjab where the non-Muslims are in a majority.

In this connection it will not be out of place to provide the readers the opinion of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, than whom no one else has applied scientific and dispassionate thought to the Pakistan roblem. In the course of his comment on the breakdown Gandhi-Jinnah talks, he put some very pertinent questions Mr. Jinnah. They are :—

" What do the words 'subject to such territorial adjustents as may be necessary' which occur in the Lahore Resolu- mean? What were the territorial adjustments the League d in mind? What does the word 'finally' which occur in the last part of the Lahore Resolution mean? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an independent and sovereign state? if Mr. Jinnah's proposal is that the boundaries of Eastern and Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he allow the

scheduled castes (or if I may say so, the non-Muslims in Bengal and the Punjab) to determine by a plebiscite whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan, and whether Mr. Jinnah would be prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and Bengal? Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through the United Provinces and Bihar to connect up Eastern Pakistan with Western Pakistan? It would have been a great gain if a straight question had been put to Mr. Jinnah and an unequivocal answer obtained."*1

While considering Dr. Ambedkar's questionnaire we must not forget that only a short time ago he was a powerful champion of Pakistan. If even he finds fault with Mr. Jinnah's stand, it means that there is something radically wrong with Mr. Jinnah's ideology. For Mr. Jinnah there is only one alternative. Either he should accept 'the maimed and mutilated' Pakistan as he calls it, or he must give up his demand for separation. Pakistan of his dream and conception can never come into being whatever may happen. It is for Mr. Jinnah to decide and choose. It is difficult to convince Mr. Jinnah of the futility of stand that he has taken. He refuses to admit that no possible modification of provincial boundaries can solve the problem of minorities. Let him ponder over the matter calmly, and he will find that his Pakistan will not solve the communal problem of India. If he refuses to hear his own countrymen, he should try to understand what others say about his scheme of Partition of India. Says Mr. Alfred Cobbon, in his thesis on "National self-determination."

"No possible modification of provincial boundaries, however, can eliminate the problem of minorities. The establish-

*1. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's statement, dated October 4, 1944, issued from Bombay.

ment of Pakistan would still leave some 18½ million Muslims in Hindu territory, and would also place an appreciable number of Hindus under Muslim rule. The only lasting solution, it has been said, is their transfer ; but if such a policy is conceivable in parts of Europe, it is out of the question with the far greater numbers involved in India. Another danger in the path of self-determination inside India is irredentism. The fact must be faced that even on a provincial basis national homogeneity is not attainable in India. This is not a purely negative conclusion : it has one very important positive implication. If the establishment of more or less united nation—states which is the main justification for the partition of India is to separate sovereign states, is not in fact going to be achieved by it, then the case for partition becomes distinctly weaker."*1

PLEBISCITE

The question of plebiscite was another important hurdle which Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah failed to cross during their negotiations. There were fundamental differences between the viewpoints of the two leaders.

1. Whether plebiscite is to be held before India is free or after.

2. Whether only the Muslims are to be entitled to take part in it or the non-Muslims also.

Regarding the first point Gandhiji was of the opinion that " the form of the plebiscite and franchise must be left to be decided by the provisional interim government unless we decide it now." Mr. Jinnah on the other hand maintained and still maintains that this issue should be decided immediately. As he put it in his letter to Gandhiji dated 25-9-44 " you say that if the vote is in favour of separation they shall be allowed to form a separate state as soon as

*1 Alfred Cobbon — "National self determination," p. 128.

possible after India is free from foreign domination. Whereas we propose we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately and by our united front and efforts to do everything in our power to secure the freedom and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan."

It should be noted that nowhere in his letter, or as a matter of fact, during the whole negotiations did Mr. Jinnah ever mention the word plebiscite. He is totally opposed to it. He wants the Congress to recognise the All-India Muslim League as the only representative body of the Mussalmans of India, and Muslim League's demand for partition be accepted immediately as a demand of the entire Muslim nation. But Gandhiji could not accept it, and as he justly put it, "the first condition for the exercise of the right of self-determination is the achieving of independence by the joint action of all parties and groups composing India." It clearly means that in Gandhiji's opinion the question of plebiscite is to be decided after the foreign power has withdrawn. These two points of view were opposed to each other and therefore there could not be any agreement.

The second point in dispute was whether the non-Muslims have a right to participate in plebiscite or not. Gandhiji was of the opinion that plebiscite should be of the entire adult population. He was perfectly right when he said, "the League is by far the more representative of Muslim opinion, but I can not despise the others by simply saying that they have no Muslim backing. What does it matter if they have no more Muslim backing if the opinion represented by a single Muslim, or by a body of Muslims whom you can count on your fingers is intrinsically sound? The way of approaching a question is not to examine the numerical strength of those behind the opinion, but to examine the soundness of the

opinion on merits or else we will never reach a solution, and if we reach one, it will be a blind solution simply because it is the wish of the largest body. If the largest body goes wrong it is up to me to say you are wrong and not to submit. The rule of majority does not mean that it should suppress the opinion of even an individual, if it is sound. And an individual's opinion should have greater weight than the opinion of many, if that opinion is sound on merits. That is my view of real democracy."

Gandhiji clarified his position further in the course of an interview given to Stewert Gilder of the "News Chronicle". When Mr. Gilder put him a straight question, "if Mr. Jinnah agreed to your view of division, but insisted there should be no plebiscite, or a plebiscite in which only the Muslims would vote, would you settle on this issue? "Never" replied Gandiji. "How could I agree in a personal or any other capacity to decide the future of millions of people without their having anything to say about their destiny."

Mr. Jinnah's reactions to Gandhiji's proposals were quite different, though in no way unexpected. He made it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that if he could have his way he would not allow any non-Muslim to exercise his right of vote. n his letter to Gandhiji, dated September 21, 1944, he propounded the following theory :—

"Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severence or secession from any existing union which is non-existent in India. The right of self-determination, which we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as such it will be the self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right."

Mr. Jinnah's assertion was not acceptable to Gandhiji. It also failed to find favour even with the minorities. Com

menting on Mr. Jinnah's attitude Dr. B. R. Ambedkar declared on October 4, 1944 :—

"In the North-West area, out of which the state of Western Pakistan is to be carved, the scheduled castes population is not less than ten per cent of the total. Similarly in the Eastern zone, out of which the state of Eastern Pakistan is to be carved, the scheduled castes population is as much as twenty per cent if not more. They are a necessary party to the dispute. Mr. Gandhi, nor the Congress, nor the Hindu Mahasabha, is entitled to speak for them Mr. Jinnah must know he can not be allowed to walk away with so large a population of the scheduled castes without their consent. If Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi ignore this vast bulk of population on the schemes they are formulating they will do so at their own peril and their own risk. The scheduled castes are a necessary party. Nothing will be deemed by them to be settled which is settled without their having their independent say in the matter. As I am concerned over the question of Pakistan, I must state my position that the scheduled castes could not be allowed to be included in Pakistan without their express consent either in the Western zone, or in the Eastern zone, that consent be given expressly and in most positive terms such as a free referendum of their own."

Besides the scheduled castes the other non-Muslim minorities have also expressed their determination not to let Pakistan come into being without their consent and approval. They refuse to be led into blind alley without knowing what is in store for them. They can not be a party to any settlement in which they have no say. It is really a strange conception of a democratic state that the very establishment of the state deprives a large population of their fundamental right to freedom of expression. This is neither democracy nor freedom.

It is sheer dictatorship and downright betrayal of the minorities, who can never be a party to it. By refusing to recognize the right of the minorities, Mr. Jinnah is digging with his own hands the grave of Pakistan. Lack of appreciation and understanding by the minorities might prove the greatest hurdle for Mr. Jinnah to cross. He cannot build his Pakistan by riding rough shod over the feelings and sentiments of minorities. Mr. Jinnah in his heart of hearts knows that the achievement of Pakistan would be difficult if not impossible, without the co-operation of other elements in India's political life, yet instead of winning them over to his side, he has by all possible means alienated them all except the Communists, and the Muslim League which is his own creation. There is not a single political party in the country which is prepared to support him. He stands isolated in the political arena of this country.

We have examined all the important issues raised by the Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations. In the words of Gandhiji "an ocean separates the two leaders." As a matter of fact, both of hem are to-day the embodiments of two contradictory political ughts. They are fundamentally opposed to each other, and re can be no compromise between them so long as they stick their present stand.

There is one important question which emerges out of these historic negotiations. One can justly ask why is it that Gandhiji has changed his position from an uncompromising opponent of Pakistan to an abettor of separation. He may not agree, but the fact is that Gandhiji's stand during his conversation with Mr. Jinnah was quite different from the one taken up by him earlier. There was a time, when he had declared that he unity of India was an article of faith with him, and yet during his negotiations he was prepared to give the right of separation to the Muslims. This position becomes all the

more astounding when w e recall his stand during the Cripp's negotiations. It is an open secret that one of the reasons why Gandhiji was not prepared even to consider the Cripp's proposals was the non-accession clause in that scheme. Mr. Louis Fisher, the famous American journalist pens down Gandhiji's reactions to the Cripp's scheme in the following words :—

" One of the chief flaws is the provision in the Cripp's proposals regarding the Princes. The British maintain that they must protect the Princes under treaties which they forced on the Princes for Britains advantage. The Maharaja of Bikaner, and I treat him as any X. Y. Z., reigned before the British came, and had more power than now. The second flaw is the recognition of Pakistan. The difference between the Hindus and the Muslims have been accentuated by the British rule. Now they have been given their minimum scope by the Cripp's offer. Lord Minto started this when he was Viceroy (1909) by establishing separate electorates for the two religious communities, and since then the British have sought to divide us still farther. Lord Curzon was a great administrator. I never met him as I have met Chelmsford, Irwin (Halifax), and Linlithgow. But he said one thing to one man, another to a second man, and still a third thing to a third man. With Sir Samuel Hoare, I know whom I am talking to. I know where he stands. But not with Curzon. The division of Bengal as carried out by Curzon was a necessary reform. It was a good measure. But it had the effect of dividing the province according to religion. Cripps introduced the same principle in his offer. That is a second big flaw. There can be no unity in India, therefore, as long as the Britishers are there."*1

In spite of this clear declaration Gandhiji in a way has accepted the principle of partition. May be, in his desire to

*1. Louis Fisher—"A week with Gandhi," p. 15-16.

force the hands of the British bureaucracy or to steel thunder out of Mr. Jinnah's demand, he unwillingly conceded the demand of the Muslim League. He made it clear even to Mr. Jinnah, when in his letter dated September 29, 1944, he wrote :—

" Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of 1940."

These lines will reveal the inner working of Gandhiji's mind. He did not have any faith in Mr. innah's two-nation theory, and yet he consented to recommend to the Congress to accept it. It was no doubt his desire to placate British Imperialism that forced him to adopt this course of action. But we can not ignore the fact that his acceptance of this principle encouraged the disrupters, and infused a new life into the dying movement of separatism. It encouraged for the time being those who were championing the cause of separatism, and it damped the enthusiasm of those who were working for the unity and integrity of India.

In this chapter we have discussed the Congress viewpoint regarding Pakistan. The last official pronouncement on the subject on behalf of the Congress was made on the 8th August 1942. Since then much water has flowed down the Ganges. New conditions have risen and new circumstances have been created. The Congress must again define in a clear and definite language its attitude towards Pakistan and separatism. In this connection we would commend to the readers the resolution passed by a meeting of the representative Congressmen of the United Provinces. This is not the official or the authoritative pronouncement on behalf of the Congress but it certainly does give a lead to the Congress in defining its attitude

towards the vexed question of Pakistan. The resolution deserves thoughtful consideration by every patriotic Indian, as it is the most sensible resolution on the subject. It runs as follows :—

" Fully conscious of the fact that a settlement fair to all parties, is a vital part of India's fight for freedom, this Assembly is of opinion that while the profession of a particular faith can not be accepted as the criterion of nationality, such parts of the country as have evolved their own characteristics in the course of their historical growth and express through a general plebiscite a desire for separate existence, should be permitted to function as autonomous states fully competent to develop along lines suited to the individual genesis of each, but the sovereigny exercisable by these states must be limited by the simultaneous existence of a central machinery, vested with powers and resources adequate to the task of guarding the independence and other interest of the country which must be considered as an indivisible unit for thi purpose, in international society. The history of India during the last five centuries amply demonstrates that while every centralization of power strangles the growth and free manifestation of cultural life, the existence of a strong central government is the only safeguard against foreign aggression."

The solution suggested in the above resolution is the only sensible, practicable, and logical solution of this problem.

CHAPTER VI

Unity of India

What is then the alternative? Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League insist upon the vivisection of India, while the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Liberal Federation, the Akali Party, the Sikh League, the Majlis Ahrar, the Momin Conference, the Shia Conference and all other political organizations are opposed to any partition of India. The attitude of the British Government, which is mainly responsible for the present separatist movement in India, is also clear. The British Government encouraged Mr. Jinnah and patted him on the back, so long as they wanted him to counterbalance the influence and prestige of the Congress. They used him and his utterances in their propaganda against the Congress. But recent pronouncements of some eminent British statesmen including the past and present Viceroys of India show a change in their attitude, and also their opposition to any constitutional plan which will undermine the unity and integrity of India. It was Lord Linlithgow, who first struck the note of dissent, and who gave an inclination of the inner working of the mind of British statesmen. Speaking at Calcutta on December 17, 1942 he declared :—

" Geographically, India for practical purposes is one, I would judge it to be as important as it ever, was in the past,

nay more important, that we should seek to conserve that unity in so far as it may be built up consistently with full justice for the rights and legitimate claims of the minorities, whether those minorities be great or small. That would be a desirable aim, no one, gentlemen can doubt who tests that position in terms of foreign policy, of tariff policy, of defence policy, of industrial development. Can India speak with the authority that she is entitled to claim ? Can she play her part effectively at international discussions, at discussions with other parts of the empire if she is to speak with two voices " ?

This view was reiterated by Viscount Wavell, the present Viceroy of India. In the course of his first address to the members of the Central Legislature, he said :—

" I can only say this : You can not alter geography. From the point of view of defence, of relations with the outside world, of many internal and external economic problems, India is a natural unit.

What arrangements you decide to make for two great communities, and certain other important minorities, as well as the Indian states, to live within that Indian Unit and make up the best use of its wealth and opportunities, is for Indians to decide. That two communities, even two nations can make arrangements to live together inspite of differing cultures or religions, history provides many examples. The solutions of the problem have varied. England and Scotland after centuries of strife arrived at an absolute union, and in Canada, the British and French elements reached a federal agreement which operates satisfactory ; the French, Italian and German elements in Switzerland agreed on a different form of federation. In all the above there are religious, as well as racial, differences. In the United States many elements, racial and religious, have been fused into one great

nation with a federal structure after the bitter experience of a disastrous civil war. In Ireland the conflicting elements have so far failed to unite, and Ireland has a sort of Pakistan, though the analogy is of course only relative. The Soviet Union in Russia seems to have devised a new modification of its already flexible system, which will also no doubt repay careful study. These examples are before India for her constitutionalists to study. It is for her to say which will most nearly fulfil her own needs. But no man can alter geography."

The British Government, through two successive Viceroys, have made it abundantly clear, that if left to them, they will have no truck with any plan that disturbs the geographical unity of India. But it does not necessarily mean, that the British Government will stick to this policy for all time to come. Their policies and decisions are governed by changing circumstances. If they find that for a number of years to come they are firmly established in this country, they will not let any body talk of Pakistan or any such scheme. But if forced by circumstances they are compelled to transfer power to Indian hands, they might accept the principle of Pakistan, as they did in case of Ireland As far as the British Government is concerned, nothing positive can be said about their attitude, though at present they are inclined in favour of preserving the integrity of India.

But the position of the Indian political parties is clear beyond any shadow of doubt. They all stand for the unity of India, the Congress is opposed to Pakistan on principle, and the Congress is the main political party which counts. The Muslim League will never get Pakistan, if it does not come to terms with the Congress. Dr. Syed Abdul Latif realised this simple truth long ago. It was for this reason that he has been urging Mr. Jinnah again and again to settle with

the Congress. In the course of an interview published in "The Hindu," dated August 23, 1942, he said :—

"If Mr. Jinnah is truly alive to the reality of the danger inherent in the present situation and is anxious to improve it, he should entertain no longer cheap notions of party prestige, but straight away seek contact with Mahatma Gandhi and prevail upon him to agree to a formula, honourable alike to the British Government and the people of India, including the Muslims. Let him put Mahatma Gandhi and the British Government to an acid test and then his position would be unassailable. If unfortunately he fails in the attempt, the blame for the future will be at others, door and not his. That is a duty he must discharge not merely in the interests of the Muslims but the country at large."

This view is shared by a large body of Muslims all over the country. But Mr. Jinnah's egoism and vanity are insatiable. Not once during the last six or seven years did he take any initiative to come to terms with the Congress. On the other hand, his attitude towards other political parties, specially the Congress, has been most deplorable. He has treated with contempt every effort of the Congress to settle the communal problem. It is no exaggeration to say that the communal problem was never so complicated and intricate as it is to-day, and no body is more responsible for it than Mr. Jinnah. It was probably this attitude of his which brought forth a severe criticism from Dr. Syed Abdul Latif. Criticising Mr Jinnah's attitude he says :—

"Mr. Jinnah has many personal virtues, but his manners as a leader, his treatment of political opponents, his obstructionist tactics and his aggressive method of the presentation of the Muslim standpoint have all gone to weaken what is intrinsically a strong case of the Muslims which I

know he deeply loves. He must know that the intellectuals among the Muslims, particularly the younger generation, are growing increasingly restless over his politics. If Mr. Jinnah would lay his hand on his heart and reflect, he would feel that, during these three years of war, he has been simply sitting on the fence, surrounded by a docile and colourless Working Committee of his own creation, waiting opportunities of but temporary gain, or quarreling with the Congress on the one hand, and some of his own colleagues in the League on the other, over issues of pretty prestige, or nursing unsophisticated Muslim masses on slogans of a brand of Pakistan, the full and numerous implications of which I have reason to believe, he and his Working Committee have neither studied nor attempted to grasp."

But Mr. Jinnah's personal character is not under discussion. What we have to discuss and decide is, whether there can be any alternative to Pakistan, which can on one side satisfy the aspirations and desires of Mussalmans of India and on the other maintain the integrity and unity of India. The Muslim League knows it, and if it has not realised it so far, it is time that its leaders should know that they can never have Pakistan at the point of the bayonet. The British Government have made their attitude clear on the point through rious pronouncements made by British statesmen. The Hindu Mahasabha, which claims to be the only representative body of the Hindus, has declared uucompromising opposition to Pakistan. The brave Sikh community of the Punjab, without whose co-operation there can be no Pakistan, has solemnly vowed to fight against any attempt to divide India on communal basis. The only political organization which is prepared to accommodate the Muslim League is the Indian National Congress, but even the Congress is not prepared to go the length of supporting the demand for a division of

India on religious basis. The Congress's case against the partition of India has been ably summed up by Dr. Rajendra Prasad in the following words :—

" The fundamental thing, which can not be conceded by any one who does not approve of partition of India, is that these units shall not have sovereign power which will militate against the sovereignty of India as a whole and thus expose the country to conflicting policies dictated by the centre and the units. Instead of insisting upon theoretically complete sovereignty for the units, would it not be better to consider the whole question in detail and visualize and define in what respects interference in the internal administration of the units can be apprehended and in what way that can be constitutionally prevented ? I do not apprehend that as long as the unity and safety of India as a whole are guaranteed, the questions relating to the distribution of power between the centre and the units would present insurmountable difficulties. But any device which in any way jeopardises the unity and safety of India as a whole is not likely to be accepted by the vast majority of the Indians." *1

The attitude of the Congress towards the separatist tendencies in Indian politics has been ably expressed by Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru in the following words :—

" Communalism began in India by a demand for a specified share in services and in representation in the Legislatures. It is now developed into an openly anti-national, anti-democratic movement demanding the partition of India. For a long while it had no constructive or otherwise. It lived on invective, violence and general offensiveness. It is amazing how it vulgarised our public life. It discovered what it had valued most in past—separate electorates—brought little good. In fact, they

*1 Pakistan Issue, p. 108

weakened minority groups. Then by the very force of the logic of hatred and separation that it has pursued, it had to go to the extreme of demanding a partition of India."*1

Commenting on the various attempts made by the Congress to satisfy the communal aspirations of the minorities Pt. Nehru says :—

" It passes the wit of man to devise further safe-guards for a minority, but if any other expedients to ensure confidence in a minority or to protect its interests suggest themselves, the Congress will gladly consider them for the Congress is anxious to settle this problem to the satisfaction of all. But nothing can be accepted which goes against Indian freedom or democracy or disrupt India. Nor can a minority be allowed to dominate or over-ride the majority. After all, the majority has also some rights."

So the Muslim League leaders must understand that the Congress will not readily accept their demand for the partition of India. And with the Congress in opposition, they can never coerce the British Government into submission. Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly threatened that the Mussalmans will get Pakistan by force if need be. Speaking at the Provincial Muslim League Conference held at Lyallpur in November 1942, he went to the length of declaring that they might even take up sword to attain Pakistan. If Mr. Jinnah wants to earn cheap notoriety by playing to the gallery, and by making exciting and provocative speeches, he is at liberty to do so. But he must understand, that violence, begets violence, and hatred breeds hatred. If today, he excites his co-religionists to voilence, tomorrow Mr. Savarkar and Master Tara Singh can also do the same, and the result will be that Pakistan Scheme will be drowned in the rivers of blood that

*1 J. Nehru—Unity of India, p. 387.

will flow in this country. Whatever Mr. Jinnah may say to-day, he will have to come to terms with other political parties. So it is time that all other alternatives to Pakistan were fully thrashed out.

Mr. Jinnah says that the Muslims are a separate nation, and they want an independent and sovereign home-land, where they can attain their full nationhood. It is a debatable point whether the Hindus and the Muslims, constitute one nation or they are two separate nations. But even assuming for argument's sake, that the Muslims are a separate nation, the question will arise—is it not possible for the Muslims of India to attain fullest political, social and economic development without disrupting the unity of India ? Is it really essential to divide India into small states, before the Muslims can become a really progressive and independent nation ? To answer this question, we will have to scan through the pages of the history of other countries. Russia, Canada and China, present almost the same picture of communal complexities as we find in India. And yet the minorities in any of these countries never demanded the partition of their Motherland. Take for instance the case of Canada. Its population consists of two different eommunities, namely, the English and the French, and they both profess different religions, cultures and traditions. The French Canadians are all Roman Catholics, while the English Canadians follow the Protestant religion. Their Church is different, their language is different, their culture is different. They had been torn asunder by acute divisions for a long time. " And yet despite these differences in race, language, religion and outlook on life no other provinces in dominion have achieved so much in common politically."*1

*1 Radha Kuma Mukerjee "A new approach to communal problem " p. 57.

As a matter of fact, the present tendency in Canada shows a trend towards more and more centralization. The one lesson that this war has taught these Canadians as well as other European nations is, that the days of decentralization have gone. The future will demand concentration and centralization of more power in the hands of the central government of a country. A country which is split up into smaller states, and which has no strong and stable central government is bound to suffer in the long run. Let those who want to divide India learn a lesson from the present day Europe. Smaller states of Europe have become a menace not only to their own existence, but to the freedom, peace, and progress of mankind. They cannot defend themselves, and the result is that they have become helpless pawns in the chess board of European politics. Bigger powers try to exploit them to gain their own ends, and in this exploitation comes the inevitable clash, resulting in war and bloodshed.

The other country, which offers us some guidance in solving our communal problems, is the U. S. S. R. Perhaps no other country in the world contains so diverse and diametrically opposed elements in its fold as Soviet Russia. We should first examine the political and social composition of the Union of socialist Soviet Republics. The Union comprises :—

1. A population of 170,000,000.
2. 180 different nationalities.
3. 151 different languages.
4. 11 national republics.
5. 22 autonomous republics.*

But in spite of all these divisions Soviet Russia is a federal state. Its various national and autonomous republics

* R. K. Mukerjee "New approach to communal problem,"

enjoy a large measure of autonomy, in their internal affairs. But in spite of it there is a strong national government working as the Central authority to co-ordinate the affairs of the different states. The credit for this unification must go to the leaders of the Russian Revolution ; when they came to power, separatist and disintegrating tendencies were working in full force, and there was every probability of Russia being divided into different states. But in 1917 the Bolsheviks on assumption of responsibility made a declaration which had the profound effect of uniting the different communities and nationalities under one flag. The new Government made the following fateful pronouncement :—

" Mohammadans of Russia, Tartars of the Volga and Crimea, Kirghiz and Sartis of Siberia and Turkistan, Turks and Tartar of Trans-Caucasia ; your beliefs and customs, your national institutions and culture, are hereafter free and inviolable. You have the right to them. Know that your rights as as well those of all the peoples of Russia, are under the powerful protection of the Revolution, and of the organs of the Soviets for workers, soldiers and peasants. Lend your support to this Revolution and to its government."

This proclamation had the magic effect, and it brought all the diverse elements of Russia under one regime. Though different provinces and states enjoy complete autonomy in their internal affairs, they all work under the protection and guidance of the Central Soviet Government, in all matters affecting their country as a whole. As observed by the Webbs :—

" The state as a whole, maintains its unity unimpaired and has even, like other federal states, increased its centralization of authority. It is only in the U. S. S. R. that this centralization involves no lessening of the cultural autonomy of the minorities."

But recently a change has been effected in the Russian constitution. All the republics in the Soviet Union have been given full powers to make independent treaties with foreign states, and to secede from the Union should they so desire. These republics have also been allowed to have independent army units of their own. M. Molotov, before putting this proposal for consideration before the Supreme Soviet, said :—

" It is now proposed to give full powers to the Soviet Republics, to enter into relations with foreign states and make treaties with them. This makes it necessary to set up foreign commissariats of Soviet Republic and in addition a foreign commissariat of the Union of there publics."

M. Molotov is also reported to have said :—

"The formation of independent battle units of different nationalities would strengthen the structure of the army and increase its weight." Some political observers think that this move on the part of the Soviet Union has been made to counteract the influence of other western powers at the Peace Conference. In ordinary course Russia would have been allowed one representative at the Peace Conference, while other powers specially the British Government would have had the backing of a number of representatives from different states of the British Empire. But now Russia like the British Empire, will also have the backing of at least 16 representatives from different Republics of the Soviet Union. That will considerably strengthen the hands of her representatives at the Peace Conference. The propriety or otherwise of this move of the Soviet Union is beyond the scope of our present discussion. What we have to take note of, is the fact that in spite of autonomy and freedom granted to the various Soviet Republics, Soviet Russia still remains a Union. All the Republics, though

they are autonomous, are joined together under one Union. It is said that the Russian solution of the communal problem has proved most successful, and this assertion is correct to a great extent. Naturally, therefore, the question will arise, is it not possible to find out some solution of the Indian problem without breaking up the unity and integrity of India ? Coming nearer home we have the example of the Chinese Muslims. " Some authorities estimate the number of Mussalmans living in China to be at least 5 crores; others seven crores. No exact census has ever been taken. In a learned essay recently published, a Chinese, Mr. Manying Kung, declares that they constitute one per cent. of China's total population. This might be insignificant if evenly apportioned over the whole territory, but the majority are congregated in certain districts which form so many Muslim islets. Among these Sinkiang is the largest. Kansey, Chinghai and to a lesser extent Sikang are also Muslim centres."

But in spite of this concentration of the Muslim population in certain areas of China, the Chinese Muslims have never made the preposterous demand that they should be separated from the rest of China. Their love for China is second to none. They are as much nationalists as any other Chinese. We have the testimony of Alexander David Neel, a French Orientalist, who has been contributing a number of articles on Chinese affairs in 'Asia'.*[1] Writing about the Chinese Mohammadans he says :—

" Most of the Mohammadans in the Far West are staunch believers in their religion and, even when their faith happens to be tinged with some indifference they, nevertheless, remain firmly attached to Islam. Proofs of their loyalty to China during the present war are not lacking, yet their patriotism

*1 " Asia," December, 1943.

as Chinese probably ranks second to their allegiance to the Prophet and their solidarity with their Muslim brethren."

But Mr. Alexender Neel scents a danger in the proposed Pakistan State in India, and he thinks it might have some adverse effect on the Muslims in China. Consequently he says :—

"China unlike India has no Mohammadan problem. Nevertheless, Muslims are by no means a negligible element in China, especially in the North-West, and none can foresee what effect the establishment of a Muslim State in Asia, such as the "Pakistan," of which Muslims in India dream, might have upon them. The Japanese have, of course, already held out the alluring prospects of a Muslim Empire, but so far the Chinese Muslims do not appear to have responded to that enticement."*1

Thus we have before us the illuminating examples of China, Canada and Russia. These countries have solved their minority problems without resorting to the extreme step of the vivisection of their country. In the case of China and Canada, the question of partition has never arisen, and there is no likelihood of its becoming a live issue in the near future. In Russia the right of secession has been granted to certain autonomous states but it has never been exercised by them. Whether the right of secession should at all be given to any state within a country is a point on which politicians differ. We have before us the example of modern Russia, where this right has been granted. Admirers and supporters of Soviet Russia declare that Russia would not have been what she is to-day, if her autonomous Republics had not been given this right. This is correct to a great, extent but, who can deny that they have not exercised this right because they

*1 "Asia," December 1943, p. 678.

are wedded to the ideal of communism, and it is this ideal which has welded them into one united and powerful state. We have before us also the example of United States of America.

The Civil War in America was fought on the issue of the right of a part of a state to secede from it. On the eve of American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln made the following historical declaration :—

" I hold that the Union of these states is perpetual. No state, upon its own mere action, can lawfully get out of the Union."

The American Civil War was fought on the clear issue of right of a part of a state to secede from it. Just as supporters of Soviet Russia claim, that she would not have been what she is to-day, if the right of secession had not been given to different states, advocates of American unity declare that America would not have been what she is to-day if her people has agreed to give the right of secession to those states who were once anxious to quit the American Union. We have, therefore, before us two outstanding examples of two contradictory principles, and it is for us to decide which way lies our salvation. While endeavouring to find a solution of our problem, we can not forget the unchallengeable fact that both Russia and America are to-day two united federations of different states, and in this unity and integrity lies their strength and glory. To partition a country into different states is a crime against the people of that country. It is perhaps for this very reason that Ireland harbours a standing grievance against Great Britain. Mr. D. Valera has repeatedly declared that the Irish Nation will not forgive Britain for dividing Ireland, and will never rest so long as this crime against the Irish nation has not been undone. Ireland is

She can not punish Britain for the crime of destroying her unity and integrity. But as a self-respecting and proud nation, she can demonstrate her anger and utter disapproval of the British policy, and she is doing it in many ways.

Which way then lies the salvation of India? The way of one strong and united India. Of course there are diversities of blood, colour, language, etc., etc. But under those diversities lies the perpetual and unbreakable unity of India. As Mr. Wincent Smith says :—

" India beyond all doubt possesses a deep underlined fundamental unity, far more profound than that produced either by geographical isolation, or by political suzerainty. That unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners and sect."*1

And Sir Fredric White, in " The Future of East and West" also stresses this unity, when he says :—

" The greatest of all the contradictions in India is that over this diversity is spread a greater unity, which is not immediately evident because it failed historically to find expression in any political cohesion to make the country one but which is so greatly a reality, and so powerful, that even the Mussalman world in India has to confess that it has been deeply affected by coming within its influence."

The Muslim League leaders do not and will not agree with this point of view. It is not in the interests of the present day leadership of the Muslim League to come to terms with other political parties. That is probably one of the reasons, why the Muslim League has not even once taken any initiative to solve the communal problem. During the last six or seven years we have witnessed various attempts made by different political parties to come to some sort of terms

*1 Wincent Smith—"Oxford History of India."

with the Muslim League, but every attempt failed because there was no response from the other side. The Congress leaders many a time, even at the risk of being misunderstood, went out of their way to placate the Muslim League but without any results. As a matter of fact, every attempt made by the Congress leaders was met by greater intransigence and obduracy on the part of the Muslim League specially its leader Mr. Jinnah. The Hindu Mahasabha through its working Presiden Dr. Shyam Prashad Mukerjee, tried to settle with the Muslim League but failed. The Sikhs in the Punjab through their representatives opened negotiations with Mr. Jinnah, but only to realize in the end that there could be no settlement with the Muslim League. The liberal leaders like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and others appealed to Mr. Jinnah for rational understanding of communal problem but all in vain. There is probably no greater champion of the Muslim League cause amongst the Hindus, than Shriyut C. Raj Gopalacharia. He has a matter of fact staked his whole political career for the sake of the Muslim League, but even he has not been able to persuade Mr. Jinnah to come to some settlement. Why this uncompromising and irreconcileable attitude on the part of the Muslim League ? The answer is simple. The Muslim League will not come to settlement with other political parties, if it can conveniently avoid it, because,

" Separate votes, separate electorates, separate provinces statutory safeguards, all have been asked for and given. The next logical step, if it had to be taken, was to demand separate states. This is implicit in the logic of the Muslim League politics. The League must perpetually keep on raising it demand if its appeal to the masses is to remain unaffected. If the demands are not continuously screwed up the tension threatens to snap. This is an additional proof of the